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5Economic Development and Female Labor Force 
Participation in the Middle East and North Africa:  
A Test of the U-Shape Hypothesis
By Kelsey Chapman
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the relationship between economic development 
and female labor force participation in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). Using a panel data set of 20 countries in the region for the 
period of 1990-2012, I develop an econometric model that tests the 
U-shape hypothesis. This study builds upon previous literature examining 
the U-shape hypothesis in time series studies for developing countries, 
and cross-country studies. The results of this paper suggest that there 
is a U-shaped relationship between economic growth and female labor 
force participation rates. The MENA region’s low female labor force 
participation rates can be explained in part by their transition towards the 
bottom of the U-shaped curve.
I. Introduction 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has the lowest 
female labor force participation rates in the developing world (Verme, 
2014). Despite moderate economic growth, gains in female education, and 
drops in fertility rates, female labor force participation rates have stayed 
incredibly low in the region. In some cases, the participation rates have 
even fallen over the past few decades, as is the case in Morocco. Are 
countries in the MENA region just at the turning point of the U curve, or 
are there other unknown factors at play? 
Understanding the relationship between economic development 
and female labor force participation is important for a variety of reasons. 
The U-shape hypothesis suggests that there is a sort of tradeoff between 
6gender equality and economic growth during a country’s development. 
Studying this relationship is important for academics and policy makers 
alike to identify trends in labor force participation and to design and 
implement policy to that end.  
Prior research has established a U-shaped relationship between 
female labor force participation and economic development. There is a 
considerable amount of literature that has provided cross-country evidence 
for the hypothesis (Boserup, 1970; Durand, 1975; Psacharopoulos, 1989; 
Kottis, 1990; Goldin, 1995; Tam, 2011), as well as time series studies for 
developed countries such as the United States (Goldin, 1995). Few papers 
have tested the U-shape hypothesis within the context of developing 
regions and countries, however (Tansel, 2001). Even fewer have done 
econometric research focused specifically on the MENA region (Verme, 
2014; Tsani, 2012). Recent papers studying the U-shape hypothesis have 
utilized more sophisticated econometric methods and have found less 
robust evidence for the hypothesis (Gaddis, 2013; Verme 2014). 
In the next section of this paper I will discuss the theory and 
evidence behind the U-shape hypothesis. After that I will describe the 
model used, derived from previous literature (Gaddis, 2013; Verme, 
2014). In the following section I will describe the data collected to test 
the U-shape hypothesis. In the final sections I will present my results, 
limitations and conclusions.  
7II. Literature Review 
 The U-shaped hypothesis states that at the beginning of economic 
development, when agriculture dominates the economy, more women 
participate in the labor force. Typically fertility rates are still high, but most 
women have the ability to work and raise children by working on their 
family farms or by creating household businesses. As a country’s economy 
undergoes structural changes and transitions from agriculture to industry 
though, women’s labor force participation rates tend to fall. Women are 
unable to take advantage of work opportunities in formal and industrial 
sectors during the early stages of economic development. Fertility rates 
are still high, but the move from agriculture to industry limits their ability 
to work and raise children, lowering labor force participation. Women are 
also restricted from entering the labor force because of lower levels of 
female education. In fields that require heavy manual labor, social stigma 
against female workers lowers the labor force participation rate as well. 
Consistent with basic labor economic theory, as there is an overall increase 
in productivity and family earnings, there is a negative income effect on 
female labor supply (Gaddis, 2013).
In later stages of economic development, as female education 
increases, fertility rates decline, and socio-cultural attitudes evolve, the 
participation rate increases (Goldin, 1995). The emergence of white-collar 
sectors provide new employment opportunities for women that are not 
subject to the same social stigmas. Moreover, increasing access to childcare 
facilities and the availability of part-time jobs allow women to work 
8outside the home while raising children. By this point, the substitution 
effect leads to higher potential female wages which overcomes the income 
effect, raising female labor force participation as income per capita rises 
(Gaddis, 2013). 
Cross-country studies have found consistent evidence for the 
U-shape hypothesis. Goldin (1995) found that the relationship held for a 
group of about 100 countries in both 1980 and 1985. Mammon and Paxson 
(2011), using data from 90 countries from the 1970s to the 1980s, also 
found similar evidence. Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1989) looked at 
a set of 136 countries between 1960 and 1980 and also found a U-shaped 
relationship. They argue that high and low income countries have the 
highest female labor force participation rates. Tam (2011), found similar 
results using panel data for a set of 134 countries from 1950-1980. 
Goldin (1995) also examined time-series data for a study on the 
United States and found evidence for the U-shape hypothesis. Female 
labor force participation fell during the early stages of economic growth 
and rose later as development continued. Similar results were found by 
a study done by Tilly and Scott (1987) for England and France, other 
developed nations. There are fewer studies on developing countries due to 
a lack of data. Tansel (2001), examined time series evidence on provinces 
in Turkey and found evidence for the U-shaped hypothesis. 
Gaddis (2013) found less robust evidence for the U-shape 
hypothesis testing both a static (OLS and fixed effects) model and a 
9dynamic (autoregressive) model. This paper used cross-country data from 
1980-2005 and found that the results for the U-shape hypothesis were 
very sensitive to the data source used. The study also found little support 
for the structural change hypothesis from agriculture to industry as an 
explanation for low female labor force participation on the declining side 
of the U curve. The paper did find that fertility and education had a role 
in explaining the rising side of the U curve. Gaddis (2013) also estimated 
separate regressions for OECD and non-OECD countries and found no 
evidence for the U-shaped relationship among non-OECD countries. They 
concluded that, “while it remains possible that todays advanced economies 
transitioned through the U over the course of their economic development, 
the U-shape seems to have little relevance for most developing countries 
today” (Gaddis, 2013 pp. 26). 
To the best of my knowledge, only two papers have examined 
the U-shape hypothesis in the MENA region, Tsani (2013) and Verme 
(2014). Tsani (2013) tested the U-shape hypothesis and region-specific 
effects for the MENA and used the resulting coefficients to compute a 
general equilibrium model.  The paper used data from the International 
Labour Organization and the World Bank. The model employed used 
control variables for education, fertility, urbanization, religious norms, and 
unemployment rates. The estimation results were robust with the control 
variables, and found evidence for the determinants of female labor force 
participation rates as well as the U-shape hypothesis. 
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Verme (2014) divided analysis between parametric and 
nonparametric evidence using data collected from the International 
Labor Organization and the World Bank. The researcher’s nonparametric 
evidence showed that the U-shape hypothesis held both worldwide 
and within the MENA region itself.  The paper suggested that MENA 
countries are at the turning point of the U-shaped curve, explaining their 
low female labor force participation rates. The parametric evidence did 
not hold as strongly though, with some countries in the region showing 
non-significance or even an inverted U-shape. The paper used a model 
similar to Gaddis (2013) and also suggested that the U-relationship had 
little relevance for developing countries. 
The literature also provides a full discussion of the determinants of 
labor force participation, the pillars of the U-shape hypothesis. Labor force 
participation decisions seem to be jointly determined by the individual 
women and their households as well as by overall market conditions. 
Education has a positive effect on female labor force participation, by 
increasing the potential earnings made by the women as well as increasing 
the opportunity cost of not working (Tsani, 2013; Tansel, 2001). Also, higher 
education rates are usually accompanied by lower fertility rates which 
can increase female labor force participation. Fertility itself is expected 
to have a negative correlation with female labor force participation (Lin, 
2011). As socio-cultural attitudes change and women’s productive versus 
reproductive roles are valued, more and more women enter the labor force.
11
The literature suggests that female labor force participation is 
affected by economic growth, unemployment and urbanization. The 
effects of unemployment can sometimes be ambiguous. The higher the 
unemployment rate, the less likely a women will be able to find a job 
(even as opposed to a man in the MENA). The “discouraged worker” 
hypothesis implies that unemployment has a negative effect on labor 
force participation (Tsani, 2013). The degree of urbanization may affect 
the number of jobs available to women. Urban areas tend to have more 
employment opportunities, and can sometimes be more liberal in terms 
of socio-cultural attitudes. Thus, the greater number of urban areas in a 
country, the higher female labor force participation will be (Tsani, 2013). 
III. Model 
As discussed in the previous section, there is a considerable 
amount of evidence to suggest the U-shaped relationship between 
economic development and female labor force participation rates using 
cross-sectional methods. Typically GDP per capita is used as a proxy 
for economic development. The model used in the literature to test the 
hypothesis has been:
FLFPRi=α+β1lnyi+β2(lnyi)
2+ui
Yi is GDP per capita, with i acting as a subscript for countries. The U-shape 
hypothesis holds if the estimated coefficients are as follows: β1<0 and 
β2>0. This is a simple cross-country equation and is applied to one point 
in time in the literature. 
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 With more data, allowing for panels to be created, the model has 
also been transformed to: 
FLFPRit=α+β1lnyit+β2(lnyit)
2+uit
This is still a cross sectional model, because the coefficients only measure 
the average change in female labor force participation rates as GDP 
changes. This model ignores time and country specific effects, but has 
been used in the literature to find evidence for the U-shape hypothesis. The 
OLS estimator is incredibly biased without correcting for time-invariant 
heterogeneity. 
 A more appropriate model uses a fixed effects estimator, which 
controls for country specific effects (Gaddis, 2013; Verme, 2014). 
FLFPRit=αi+β1lnyit+β2(lnyit)
2+δt+uit
This controls for time-invariant, country factors effecting female labor 
force participation. δt is the fixed effects. This model is still not optimal, 
because if female labor force participation does not vary much over time, 
lagged female labor force participation is correlated with the error term. 
The regressors are most likely endogenous as well, introducing further 
issues. A linear dynamic panel data model could correct for these issues 
but such methods are beyond the scope of this paper. Estimation using 
instrumental variables and Two Stage Least Squares could also be used. 
but proper instrumental variables were not found. 
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 This paper’s model will be similar to the ones used by Gaddis 
(2013), and Verme (2014), but will use the control variables provided by 
the model employed by Tsani (2013). 
FLFPRit=αi+β1lnyit+β2(lnyit)
2+ β3educit+ β4fertit+ β5unemit+ 
β5urbanit+t+δt+uit
The added variables include controls for education, fertility, unemployment, 
and urbanization. A time trend is also included. For the U-shape hypothesis 
to hold, I would expect β1<0 and β2>0. For the control variables, I would 
expect the coefficients on education and urbanization to be positive, and 
the coefficients on unemployment and fertility to be negative. These results 
would be consistent with the arguments made in the literature which were 
discussed in the previous section. 
IV. Data 
Data for all of the variables was collected from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database. Female labor force participation 
is defined as the number of females aged 15 and up who are in the 
labor force divided by the total female population. Economic growth is 
controlled for using GDP/capita in current U.S. dollars. GDP per capita 
is the gross domestic product divided by the midyear population of the 
country. The control variable for education used was the percentage of 
female students in secondary education. This is defined as the total number 
of females in secondary school over the total number of students enrolled 
in secondary education. Fertility was controlled for using the fertility rate 
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in each country. The total fertility rate is the number of children that would 
be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years 
and bear children during that time. Unemployment rates are defined by the 
share of the labor force that is without work and is available and seeking 
employment. Urbanization is controlled for with the urban population 
percentage, or the total number of people living in urban areas over the 
total population of each country (World Bank). 
The econometric approach used pooled panel data for a set of 20 
countries for the period of 1990-2012. This is the same data used by many 
of the cross-country studies reviewed in the previous section. The data set 
is an unbalanced panel, with several observations missing over different 
variables, countries, and years. The reasons for some of the missing 
observations might be correlated with the idiosyncratic errors, which could 
lead to biased and inconsistent estimators. Collecting data in the MENA 
region has always been fraught with difficulties though, and there is no 
available data set or method to account for these missing observations.
Table 1 – Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum 
FLFP 460 24.64 11.23 9.20 58.10
GDP per capita 432 10,323.71 13,946.88 283.58 92632.68
% females secondary 
education
352 47.32 4.10 26.04 53.26
Fertility rate 460 3.45 1.30 1.50 8.67
% urban population 460 70.98 17.83 20.93 98.95
% unemployment 440 10.39 6.23 0.30 30.7
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 There is wide heterogeneity across MENA countries in terms of 
GDP per capita and urbanization rates. There is quite a difference between 
the Gulf region (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab 
Emirates), and the rest of the MENA. This could complicate estimation 
of the regression model, with the outliers biasing the coefficient estimates, 
but with such a small sample of countries over time, observations should 
not be dropped.
V. Empirical Results 
 Results for the regression estimated by OLS are shown in Table 
2. The regression output confirms the U-shape hypothesis, with similar 
results to those found in the literature. The GDP per capita variables 
are both statistically significant, with β1<0 and β2>0. In the past, results 
from this type of estimation have been used as evidence for the  U-shape 
hypothesis, but as stated previously, pooled OLS estimation is biased in 
the presence of unobserved, time-invariant effects. 
Table 2 – OLS Regression
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
GDP/capita -22.76*** 4.80
GDP/capita2 1.58*** 0.27
Education -0.84*** 0.13
Fertility -2.02*** 0.43
Urbanization 0.14*** 0.05
Unemployment -0.29*** 0.08
Time trend -0.18*** 0.07
Significance level: ***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 
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The results for the fixed effects estimation of the model are 
shown in Table 3. The econometric estimation also confirms the U-shap 
hypothesis on the relationship between economic growth and female 
labor force participation with β1<0 and β2>0. The coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant for both GDP per capita variables. A period of 22 
years may be too short to observe a full U-shape but the results suggest 
that there is one. The within R2 of the model was 56%. This is the amount 
of time variation in yit that can be explained by the time variation in the 
explanatory variables. 
Table 3 – Fixed Effects Regression
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
GDP/capita -10.96*** 2.51
GDP/capita2 0.55*** 0.13
Education -0.63*** 0.11
Fertility -2.34*** 0.34
Urbanization 0.05 0.10
Unemployment -0.10* 0.05
Time trend 0.25*** 0.05
Significance level: ***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 
 The coefficient on fertility rates was found to have a statistically 
significant, negative effect on female labor force participation, in line with 
theory from the literature. Unemployment rates also had a statistically 
significant negative effect, although the magnitude of the coefficient was 
quite small. The coefficient on urbanization was not statistically significant 
and had a small positive effect on female labor force participation. 
The coefficient estimate on education is the most puzzling, 
having a negative sign and implying that increased education leads to 
17
lower female labor force participation rates. This may be explained by the 
fact that although secondary education rates have increased dramatically 
over the past 30 years, this has not translated into increased labor force 
participation. Female labor force participation rates have remained 
stagnant despite gains in secondary and tertiary education for women in 
the MENA region (Verme, 2014). 
The most important assumption for using fixed effects is the strict 
exogeneity assumption. This holds if the idiosyncratic error in each year is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in all time periods. Using fixed 
effects, we allow some variables to be correlated with unobserved effects 
that are constant over time. It is probably not reasonable to assume that the 
dependent variables are uncorrelated with the errors. Strict exogeneity can 
be overcome if enough time-varying factors have been controlled for, but 
clearly there are more variables effecting female labor force participation 
that are not included in the regression model. These include variables to 
control for gender and social norms, which have been shown in qualitative 
research to have an important impact on female labor force participation. 
The other assumptions needed to estimate using fixed effects are 
that the errors in the regression are homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. 
Testing for serial correlation there is strong evidence of serial correlation 
in the errors (p-value=0.00). This means that the test statistics for the 
estimated regression are invalid. It is difficult to test for serial correlation 
after fixed effects estimation, but the time-demeaned errors can be used for 
all of the usual tests. 
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Testing for hetroskedasticity, there is also strong evidence that it 
exists (p-value=0.00). With the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation, I applied fixed effects to a cluster sample. Each country, or 
cross-sectional unit is treated as a cluster of observations over time. Serial 
correlation, and changing variances are allowed for in each cluster. Using 
this approach, the standard errors are raised across all of the explanatory 
variables, as seen in the regression output in Table 4. 
Table 4 – Fixed Effects Regression with robust errors 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
GDP/capita -10.96** 5.16
GDP/capita2 0.55* 0.27
Education -0.63** 0.23
Fertility -2.34*** 0.66
Urbanization 0.05 0.22
Unemployment -0.10 0.08
Time trend 0.25* 0.14
Significance level: ***=.01; **=.05; *=.1
The GDP per capita coefficients were still statistically significant, 
as well as the coefficients for the time trend, education and fertility 
variables. The coefficients for urbanization and unemployment were not 
statistically significant after using robust standard errors. 
This method still does not properly account for the fact that lagged 
female labor force participation is correlated with the error term. GDP per 
capita is an endogenous variable, and there is a feedback loop between 
female labor force participation rates and GDP per capita which biases 
the coefficient estimates. A linear dynamic panel model using Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) with instrumental variables can accommodate 
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for endogeneity and autocorrelation. Past papers have used this method, 
but it is beyond the scope of this paper.  Two Stage Least Squares could 
also be used to account for the endogeneity of GDP per capita, but a proper 
instrumental variable could not be found.
VI. Conclusions
This paper looked at the relationship between female labor force 
participation and economic growth in the MENA region. It has done so by 
using a fixed effects model with control variables for education, fertility, 
unemployment, urbanization and a time trend. The econometric results 
provided evidence for the U-shape hypothesis in the MENA region. There 
is wide heterogeneity across MENA countries, but it was still possible 
to establish a relationship between female labor force participation and 
economic growth over the time period analyzed. 
The MENA region has made significant strides in reducing 
gender gaps in human development over the past few decades. This has 
not  translated into improvements in female labor force participation, 
however (Verme, 2014). This suggests that there might be other factors 
discouraging women from participating in the labor force. Understanding 
the relationship between economic development and female labor force 
participation will help isolate in which areas the MENA region lags behind 
the rest of the developing world in terms of getting more women into 
the work force. This paper’s results suggest that part of the region’s low 
female labor force participation rates can be explained by its transition 
towards the bottom of the U-shaped curve.
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There were three problems with the estimated model, however. 
One, it only examined a short period of time. Data on most explanatory 
variables is only available starting in 1990 and this may be too short of a 
time period to observe a U-shaped transition. Until longer time series are 
made available for the region, this is not an issue that can be solved. The 
second problem with the model employed in this paper is that it did not 
control for another main pillar of the U-shape hypothesis, social and cultural 
norms relating to gender. These are important factors, but at the moment 
there is a lack of data relating to cultural factors to explain female labor 
force participation. Historically determined, initial factors may be more 
important in determining labor force participation rates as well. Without 
having the proper control variables in place for things like culture and 
gender norms, it may not be possible to properly estimate the relationship 
between economic development and female labor force participation 
rates. The final problem with the model employed is that it didn’t fully 
correct for endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity. Without 
controlling for these issues, the results are less than trust worthy. 
Finally, finding a statistically significant U-shaped relationship 
in cross-sectional analysis across countries does not mean that the 
relationship holds across individual countries (Gaddis, 2013). A limitation 
of past research, and of my research, is that cross-sectional models have 
been used on panel data. As Gaddis (2013) points out, “Data on female 
labor force participation from countries at different income levels are used 
to infer the relationship within a single country over time” (pp.12). The 
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U-shape hypothesis is about changes over time in an individual country, 
and cross-sectional results shouldn’t be an adequate test of the hypothesis. 
Until longer time series become available for countries in the MENA 
region, the U-shape hypothesis cannot be properly tested. 
22
Bibliography 
Boserup, E. (1970). Women’s Role in Economic Development. New York: St Martin's 
Press.
Durand, J.D. (1975). The Labor Force in Economic Development, Princeton: Princeton           
University Press.
Gaddis, I. and Klasen, S. (2013). Economic Development, Structural Change and 
Women’s Labor Force Participation: A Reexamination of the Feminization U 
Hypothesis. Journal of Population Economics.
Goldin, C. (1995). The U-Shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic 
Development and Economic History. Investment in Women's Human Capital 
and Economic Development, University of Chicago Press.
Kottis, A.P. (1990). Shifts over time and regional variation in women’s labour force 
participation rates in a developing economy. Journal of Development 
Economics, 33, 117-132.
Mammen, K. and Paxson, C. (2000) Women’s Work and Economic Development, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 14, 4, 141-164
Psacharopoulos, G. and Tzannatos, Z. (1989). Female Labor Force Participation: An 
International Perspective. The World Bank Research Observer, 4, 187-202. 
Tam, A. (2011). U-shaped female labor participation with economic development: Some 
panel data evidence. Economics Letters, 110, 140-142.
Tansel, A. (2001). Economic development and female labour force participation in 
Turkey: Time-series evidence and cross-province estimates. Middle East 
University Technical Paper. 
Tilly, L. and Scott, J. (1987). Women, Work and Family, Routledge, New York. 
Tsani, S. (2013). Female Labour Force Participation and Economic Development in 
Southern Mediterranean Countries: What scenarios for 2013? MEDPRO 
Technical Report, No. 19. 
Verme, P. (2014) Economic Development and Female Labor Participation in the Middle 
East and North Africa – A Test of the U-Shape Hypothesis. Policy Research 
Working Papers. The World Bank. 
23
Effects of Husband’s Education on Wife’s Earnings:
The Recent Evidence
By Humenghe Zhao
Abstract
 This paper aims to examine the relationship between husband’s 
education and his wife’s earnings. The study builds upon previous literature 
revolving around the relationship between a woman’s human capital and 
her husband’s earnings. Using pooled cross-sectional data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), I adjust the OLS wage model to estimate whether 
a man’s human capital has positive effects on his wife’s earnings. Two 
major hypotheses concerning the correlation between spousal education 
and earnings are cross-productivity effect between couples and assortative 
mating. Using the original regression model, I also estimate a sub-sample 
designed to restrict the effects of positive assortative mating. Finally, 
the result suggests that there is strong evidence for the positive effect of 
husband’s education on his wife’s earnings.
I. Introduction
Human capital is the stock of an individual’s skills, knowledge, 
abilities that can be used to produce economic value. It is widely recognized 
that formal education is an important way to obtain human capital, and thus 
labor–market productivity through providing specific skills and improving 
one’s ability to acquire and process information, to understand changing 
conditions, and to respond effectively (Becker 1964). Human capital is 
also highly influenced by interaction with surrounding people, like family 
and peers through sophisticated conversations, developing strategies and 
coping mechanisms. Marriage, as one type of association, can provide 
greater incentives to share acquired abilities and knowledge within the 
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household (Benham 1974). To the extent that this is true, not only an 
individual’s own formal education and working experience contribute to 
the individual’s effective stock of acquired abilities and productivity, but 
also the spouse’s education has important impact on one’s own economic 
outcomes, such as earnings. In this paper, I intend to explore the effect 
of husbands’ human capital on the productivity and earnings of married 
women, and the change of the effect over the past ten years.  
  Regarding the impact of spousal education, a large number of 
studies were conducted on the effect of a woman’s human capital on her 
husband’s earnings. The result of Benham’s (1974) study suggests that a 
wife’s education has a positive effect on her husband’s earnings. Jepsen 
(2005) also finds this effect significant from year 1960 to 2000, but with a 
diminishing magnitude over time. Kenny (1983), Wong (1986), Lam and 
Schoeni (1993), and Lefgren and McIntyre (1996) all reach the similar 
conclusion that spousal education has a positive impact.  However, despite 
numerous studies of the effect of wife’s education on her husband’s 
earnings, only few studies have examined the effect of a man’s human 
capital on his wife’s earnings (Huang et al. 2009, Mano and Yamamura 
2010).  Although the husband’s human capital has been examined as one 
of the significant determinants of the labor supply of married women, its 
effect on human capital and earnings of wives has been largely neglected. 
As the labor force participation of married women has expanded rapidly 
over the last 30 years, it is of great importance to explore important factors 
within the household that may give rise to this rapid growth.  
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There are two major hypotheses that have been used to interpret 
the positive correlation between spousal education and a person’s own 
earnings. First, the cross-productivity hypothesis argues that the positive 
effect is due to one’s investment in the spouse’s human capital. Second, 
the assortative mating hypothesis argues that the positive effect results 
from the fact that better-educated individuals marry more productive 
individuals (Becker 1974). My interest of study is the cross-productivity 
theory, but these two interpretations are difficult to separate. As will be 
discussed in detail later, I would use a sub-sample to control for the effects 
of positive assortative mating. 
This paper will proceed as follows. Section II will briefly review 
previous literature regarding the similar topics. Section III will introduce 
the human capital theory and the specific econometric model employed to 
exam the hypothesis. Section IV is devoted to the data and measurement 
issues and the data set used in the research. Section V discusses the results 
of OLS regression and hypothesis test and also provides some analysis on 
the results. Section VI summarizes our findings and implications.
II. Literature Review
Benham(1974) is the pioneer in studying the effect of spousal 
education on one’s earnings. In his paper, he brings up that an individual’s 
effective stock of acquired abilities will be a function of not only his/her 
own formal education and job experience but also the spousal education. 
He builds a model based on traditional human capital theories, where the 
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household is viewed as a firm whose earnings are a function of the effective 
stock of human capital for each marriage partner. His result suggests that 
educated women improve the human capital and productivity of their 
husbands within marriage.
Another early study related to this topic finds that the positive effects 
of wife’s education on the labor market productivity of men are stronger 
within families who are entrepreneurs in the family business (Wong 1986). 
More importantly, the study considers both the effects of wife’s education 
on husband’s earnings and of husband’s education on wife’s earnings 
conditional on the choice of employment status. He also finds evidence that 
women workers benefit form marrying more educated men. 
Jepsen (2005) employs the theoretical basis proposed by Benham. 
Using United States census data from 1960 to 2000, she finds that a 
wife’s education is positively associated with her husband’s earnings, but 
the magnitude of the effect declines over time. Jepsen adds some new 
explanation to this contemporary trend by conjecturing that the rapid 
increase in a wife’s labor participation reduced her time to improve 
husband’s productivity. If women use their education to further their own 
careers, the positive association of a wife’s education with her husband’s 
earnings might not exist today; but no direct evidence was provided. She 
also brings up that recent studies suggest that a person’s own education 
serves a two-fold purpose – increasing human capital and signaling 
productivity to potential employers.
Lam and Shoeni(1993) analyze the effects of family background 
on male labor market earnings in Brazil. They try to identify the magnitude 
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of the "family background bias" in conventional estimates of returns to 
schooling and to identify the direct effect of family background on earnings. 
Slightly different from the studies above, their research is based on a 
theoretical model of assortative mating and intergenerational correlations 
in income-related characteristics. Though their focus is different, they also 
find a positive effect of the wife’s education on her husband’s earnings of 
over 5% for Brazil and of 3-4% for the United States. 
In some other studies, the husband’s human capital has been 
examined as one of the significant determinants of the labor supply of 
married women. Gray (1997) finds that a wife’s labor force participation 
is negatively associated with her husband’s earnings, but they do not 
pay direct attention to the wife’s educational level. Similarly, based on 
the quantitative analysis using cross-sectional data from the CPS and the 
NLSY1979, Papps (2010) suggests that men’s education has influence on 
their wives’ working hours, even when holding the wages of both spouses 
constant, but the impact on earnings is neglected. 
The most similar studies of the kind are conducted by Huang et 
al. (2009) and Mano and Ymamura (2010).  Huang et al. successfully 
disentangles the cross-productivity and assortative mating effects by 
using Chinese twins data, and they find the importance of both effects 
in explaining spousal earnings. In particular, the mating effect exists for 
both husbands and wives, but the cross-productivity effect mainly runs 
from Chinese husbands to wives. Mano and Yamamura investigates many 
different factors that influence the labor supply and earnings among 
married Japanese women between 2000 and 2002, including husband’s 
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education, family structure, co-residence with parents or in-laws, and 
childcare. Their finding associated with husband’s education suggests 
that educated husbands reduce the labor supply of wives, but they tend to 
improve productivity and earnings of the wives once they participate in 
the labor market. 
One key similarity among all the studies concerning the role of 
spousal education in one’s own labor-market productivity is that they 
all come to the conclusion that spousal education has significant and 
positive impact on one’s own earnings.  Benham(1974), Jepsen (2005), 
Kenny (1983), Wong (1986), Lam and Schoeni (1993), and Lefgren 
and McIntyre (1996) all find evidence for the positive impact of wives’ 
education  on husband’s earnings, while Huang et al. (2009) and Mano 
and Ymamura (2010) also find positive relationship between husbands’ 
education and wives’ labor-market productivity. The primary difference is 
that previous studies employ different methods of analysis. For example, 
Benham(1974), Jepsen (2005), and Mano and Ymamura (2010) use the 
OLS wage model based on Mincer’s work(1974); while Wong(1986) 
and Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman(1991) also use Two-Stage Least 
Squares as a method to estimate a system of two equations: earnings and 
education of the wife. Using Chinese twins data, Huang et al. are able to 
use fixed-effects model to control for the mating effect. 
Most of the previous works use data before 2000s. This paper 
contributes to the literature by revisiting Benham’s OLS wage model 
using Current Population Survey data from 2003, 2004, 2013 and 2014. 
Moreover, this paper is the first to explore the association of the husband’s 
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education with his wife’s earnings using most up-to-date data. Using 
pooled cross-sections rather than simple cross-sectional data, my analysis 
is also slightly different from previous literature as an interaction term 
is added to the model to explore the change of the effect over the past 
ten years. In later discussion, I also make a comparison of the effect of 
the husband’s education on his wife’s earnings from my study to the 
effect of the wife’s education on her husband’s earnings from previous 
literature.  The discussion of such comparison can help us facilitate a 
better understanding of the contemporary role of female in the labor force 
and family.
III. Modelling
One explanation for the higher earnings of individuals married to 
more educated spouses is that their spouses enable themselves to enhance 
their own human capital and, therefore, their productivity and earnings. 
The term “cross-productivity effect” is used to describe the contribution 
of a spouse’s human capital to own productivity. As stated in the cross-
productivity hypothesis, within households consisting of only married 
couples, the effective stock of human capital for the wife is a positive 
function of the individual stock of human capital of each spouse (Benham 
1974). That is, ,, where  is the effective stock of human capital for the wife 
at time t and the indexes w and h represents wife and husband respectively. 
The individual is viewed as a firm whose earnings at time t are a function 
of the individual’s market productivity. The wife’s earnings are also a 
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function of the wife’s stock of human capital. Then, in the household that 
is viewed as a firm composed of husband and wife, the wife’s earnings 
can be expressed as a function of both partners’ human capital stock. That 
is). The first order condition is  , which indicates the positive effect of the 
husband’s effective human capital stock on his wife’s earnings. 
The empirical model used in this paper is based on Benham’s(1974) 
model, which uses a standard Mincer(1974) ordinary least squares wage 
model to consider the association of the husband’s education with his 
wife’s earnings. As will be discussed below, I also added other control 
variables and an interaction term investigating the change of the effect. 
Moreover, I used a set of dummy variables describing the wife’s education 
attainment instead of using only one variable of years of schooling. I 
estimate the following OLS model:
ln(earning)i=β0+β1*eduhi+β2*expi+ β3*expi
2+ δ1*eduw2i+ δ2*eduw3i+ δ3*eduw4i+ 
         δ4*eduw5i + δ5*whitei+ δ6*southi+ δ7*midwesti+ δ8*westi+ δ9*urbani
         +δ10*y1314i+α1*(eduh*y1314)i +µi,
where ln(earning)=log annual earnings of wife in family with wife and 
husband present, 
eduh=years of schooling completed by husband, 
exp=years of work experience of wife, 
eudw2…eduw5=wife’s education attainment modeled as a set of 
dummy variables, 
white, south, midwest, west, urban and y1314 are dummy 
variables indicate race, region, urban location and time,
(eduh*y1314) is the interaction term captures the change of the 
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effect of husband’s education on his wife’s earnings over the ten years.
The omitted categories are as follows: wife’s education—less 
than high school; race—nonwhite; location—rural, and region—East. 
Benham(1974) models the natural log of the husband’s annual 
earnings as a function of the years of schooling completed by the husband, 
the potential work experience of the husband, and potential experience 
squared. He also includes a variable for the years of schooling completed 
by the wife. Built upon this model, I include other variables that may 
explain the wife’s earnings, such as her race and the family’s geographic 
region. By adding these variables, some of the effects of omitted variables 
can be avoided. One would expect whites to earn more than non-whites 
and workers in urban areas to earn more than workers in rural areas. 
Workers in the East are likely to earn more than workers in the Midwest. 
By modeling husband’s education as his years of schooling, 
Benham gives equal weight to the difference in schooling between fifth 
grade and sixth grade as to the difference between the junior and senior 
years in college. Under the assumption that education increases one’s 
own productivity only by increasing human capital, modeling education 
as the years of schooling is appropriate. However, more recently, many 
researchers suggest that “a person’s own education serves a two-fold 
purpose—increasing human capital and signaling productivity to 
potential employers” (Jaeger and Page 1996). That is, people who have 
completed a type of degree signal their productivity and ability through 
their academic credentials. Thus, a person with 16 years of education and 
a bachelor’s degree may be viewed by potential employers as being a 
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better prospect for employment than someone with 16 years of education 
but no degree because the person with the bachelor’s degree has signaled 
an ability to complete the task of earning a college degree (Hungerford 
and Solon 1987). In order to allow for non-linear effects of education, 
the wife’s education here is modeled as a series of dummy variables.  
The categories of this classification will be described in detail in the 
data section. The positive effect of the spousal education is explained 
using a human capital approach (cross-productivity effect), not signaling 
approach: additional years of schooling allow a husband to acquire 
skills that help him assist his wife. Then, the husband’s education is still 
modeled as years of schooling.  
An alternative explanation for the positive association between 
one’s earnings and spousal education is that individuals with higher 
earnings are likely to marry partners with more desirable characteristics. 
This so-called “assortative mating” hypothesis states that people have a 
tendency to select marriage partners of a similar education level regardless 
of cross-productivity effects. For example, if men regard education as an 
asset in the marriage market, then better-educated men may attract and 
marry better-educated and more productive women (Mare 1991). In 
econometric language, the cross-productivity effect is the causal effect of 
spousal education on earnings, but the mating effect is caused by omitted 
variables. An ordinary least squares estimated of the effect of spousal 
education on earnings may not show the causal effect because spousal 
education is likely to pick up one’s own ability or the mating effect (Boulier 
and Rosenzweg 1984). Previous studies employ several different ways to 
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try to separate the two effects. For example, Benham(1974) differentiates 
between the years of the wife’s education obtained before and after her 
marriage in an attempt to distinguish between the two arguments. Huang 
et. al. use fixed effect model with unique Chinese twins data to control 
for unobserved background and ability factors.  In my study, to attempt 
to control for the marital-sorting effect, I consider a sub-sample using 
the original regression model. In the sub-sample, only couples who are 
more than 5 years apart in age are considered in an attempt to focus on 
people who are less likely to have met their mate in school (Jepsen 2005). 
However, these two interpretations are difficult to separate even with 
longitudinal data. My approach can only bring some evidence to bear on 
this issue, but may not effectively differentiate between the human capital 
interpretation and the martial sorting explanation.
IV. Data
The data are taken from the March supplements of the Current 
Population Survey for year 2003, 2004, 2013 and 2014. Data sets are 
pooled together; year 2003 and 2004 are treated as one time period, and 
year 2013 and 2014 are treated as another time period. Households are 
dropped if either spouse was a member of the armed forces or was not 
aged 20-60. The earnings variable is the log of the wife’s total wage and 
salary earnings, which is the dependent variable used in previous studies. 
The data are restricted to wives who work full-time to avoid any earnings 
effects that would be a result of part-time wok status. Dollar levels for 
each year are converted into 2000-dollar level by the Consumer Price 
34
Index for all items. Potential work experience is estimated as age minus 
schooling minus six as defined by Benham(1974). The race variables 
are white and nonwhite; the location variables are urban and rural; the 
categories for geographic region are East, West, Midwest and South. Five 
education categories were defined for wives based on the highest grade 
completed. The categories are less than a high schooling graduate, high 
school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post-bachelor’s 
degree work. The husband’s education is modeled as the continuous 
variable of years of schooling. 
Advantages of the CPS data include very large sample size and 
most up-to-date data. A disadvantage is that CPS data are cross-sectional 
rather than longitudinal, which makes it difficult to distinguish productivity 
effects form assortative mating effects. Another drawback is that the CPS 
contains no measure of individual’s ability. Though modeling the wife’s 
own education as a set of dummy variables can help to pick up one’s own 
ability according to the signaling theory discussed in the modeling section, 
without using proxies for ability, the positive causal effect of husband’s 
education is still likely to pick up wife’s own ability. However, the later 
result shows that the estimated returns to husband’s education using 
CPS data is similar to those obtained from other data sources in previous 
literature. 
The descriptive statistics of the earnings and education variables 
are reported in Table1 and reveal changing demographics for married 
couples over the past ten years. The average years of schooling increase 
for both husbands and wives from 2003-04 period to 2013-14 period. The 
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correlation coefficients that measure the degree of correlation between 
the wife’s schooling and the husband’s schooling are reported at the 
bottom of Table 1. The correlation are virtually unchanged from 2003-
04 to present, which are 0.603 and 0.604 respectively. The size of the 
correlation coefficients is slightly smaller than the correlations found 
by Benham(0.65), Shechtman and Neuman(1991) for Israel(0.684) and 
Wong for Hong Kong(0.65). The correlations provide one measure of the 
propensity for positive assortative mating with respect to education. That 
is, the propensity for people with similar educational attainments to marry 
each other. The correlation statistics suggest that not much has changed 
during the time period under study (Jepsen 2005). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
2003-04                             2013-14
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Wife
    Annual earnings(in 1000) 36.304 34.171 49.723 46.219
Earnings in 2000 dollars 33.460 31.471 36.483 33.943
    Years of schooling 13.880 2.72 14.229 2.729
    Less than a high school degree 0.050 0.218 0.036 0.187
    High school graduate 0.296 0.457 o.214 0.410
    Some college 0.298 0.457 0.276 0.447
    College graduate 0.235 0.423 0.285 0.451
    Graduate/Professional school 0.121 0.326 0.189 0.391
Husband
    Years of schooling 14.127 2.562 14.776 2.642
n 33,188 22,159
   Correlation of wife/husband       
schooling
0.603 0.604
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V. Empirical Evidence
Table 2. Regression of log of wife’s annual earnings.
Independent Variables Coefficients(robust Std. Err.)
Husband’s Education 0 .0178***
(0.0021)
Wife’s Characteristics:
High school graduate 0.360***
(0.016)
Some college 0.536***
(0.016)
College graduate 0.845***
(0.017)
Graduate/Professional school 1.084***
(0.019)
Experience 0.027***
(0.001)
Experience squared -0.0004***
(0.00002)
White 0.032*
(0.015)
Urban location 0.202***
(0.007)
Midwest -0.083***
(0.0086)
West -0.056***
(0.009)
South -0.088***
(0.0083)
Year 2013&2014 -0.012**
(0.006)
Husband’ s schooling* Year 
2013&2014
0.004***
(0.001)
Adjusted R-squared 0.204
n 55,347
***Significant at the 0.01 level
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
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Table 2 reports the regression results of estimating the econometric 
model using the full sample.  The coefficient of the key variable of interest, 
the husband’s education, is reported in the first row. All of the signs of 
the coefficient estimates on the variables were found to be in accord 
with expectations. The coefficient of the husband’s education is positive 
and significant. The simple null hypothesis that education of husband is 
unrelated to wife’s earnings can be rejected. The size of the effect is about 
0.0178, which implies that if the husband has one more year of schooling, 
his wife’s earnings would increase by about 1.78 percent holding constant 
other factors in the model. The magnitude of the effect increases by about 
0.4 percent from 03-04 period to 13-14 period. Both the estimated effect 
of interest and the estimated change of the effect over time are significant 
at 1% significance level. 
In previous studies, the size of the benefit of the wife’s education 
was about 1.5-4%. My estimation of the benefit of the husband’s education 
falls into this range, suggesting that the effect of spousal education on 
one’s own earnings is almost symmetrical. Previous studies mostly focus 
on the effect from wife to husband and conclude that the wife’s education 
provides substantial labor-market benefits to the family beyond increments 
to her own earnings. Male dominance in society is assumed when such 
studies were conducted. However, female labor force participation rate 
has dramatically increased over the past several decades, and females are 
playing increasingly significant roles in our society. With respect to this 
contemporary context, my estimation result provides evidence for such 
symmetrical effect, as the size of the effect from wife to husband is about 
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the same as from husband to wife. The slight increase of the effect may 
suggest that husbands play increasingly important role in contributing 
to their wives’ human capital accumulation. Females are taking more 
advantage of their marriage than ten years ago. 
As expected, Table 2 shows that a woman’s own educational 
attainment is a significant predictor of her earnings. The rate of return to 
a high school degree is about 36%. The return to some college is larger, 
about 53.6%. The largest rates of return are for wives with college degrees 
or higher. The return to a college degree is about 84.5%, and the return 
to post-college schooling is around 108.4%. However, the issue here is 
that the estimated returns to education are higher than those in previous 
studies. The potential reasons will be discussed later in this section. Other 
variables also have the expected signs. The return to additional years of 
experience is positive and significant, but declines with age, as the sign 
of the coefficient for the experience squared variable is negative. White 
females earn more than non-white females. Workers in the East and West 
earn more than workers in the Midwest and South. The location of the 
household also has substantial impact on the wife’s earnings, as women 
who live in urban areas earn about 20% more than women who live in 
rural areas. 
Table 3 reports the results for the model using the sub-sample of 
wives and husbands who are more than 5 years apart in age.  As discussed 
in the model development section, the purpose of using this sub-sample 
is to control for the assortative mating effect. This sub sample represents 
couples who are less likely to have met each other either in high school 
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or college. The correlation of the husband’s education and his wife’s 
earnings remains positive and significant in this case. The size of the 
benefit of husband’s education is slightly higher using this sub-sample. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients on the wife’s own education are about 
the same. There is less evidence for the earning premium of being a white, 
as the coefficient is only significant at 10% level. Also, the change of the 
benefit of husband’s education increases to about 0.6 percent, but it’s only 
significant at 10% level. 
Table 3. Regression of log of wife’s annual earnings using a sub-sample 
of couples who are more than 5 years apart in age.
Independent Variables Coefficients(robust Std. Err.)
Husband’s Education 0 .021***
(0.0034)
Wife’s Characteristics:
High school graduate 0.350***
(0.031)
Some college 0.537***
(0.033)
College graduate 0.831***
(0.035)
Graduate/Professional school 1.13***
(0.038)
Experience 0.034***
(0.003)
Experience squared -0.0006***
(0.00007)
White 0.060*
(0.017)
Urban location 0.202***
(0.007)
Midwest -0.103***
(0.021)
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West -0.051**
(0.021)
South -0.057***
(0.019)
Year 2013&2014 -0.015**
(0.007)
Husband’ s schooling* Year 2013&2014 0.006*
(0.003)
Adjusted R-squared 0.208
n 11,285
***Significant at the 0.01 level
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
*Significant at the 0.10 level 
Concerned about the ability of the model to address the 
research question, I run several diagnostic tests to check the Gauss-
Markov assumptions for OLS regression. Issues of heteroskedasticity 
were present in the model, as evidenced by the Breusch-Pagan Test and 
White’s Test for heteroskedasticity. In response, I employ robust standard 
errors. Additionally, vif test is used to test for multicollinearity. Except 
the interaction term, experience and experience squared, all other five 
variables have vif values smaller than 5, which indicates there is evidence 
of multicollinearity. Lastly, the p-value of the Ramsey RESET test is about 
0.31, so the null hypothesis is not rejected, suggesting that there is no 
evidence of functional form misspecification.
Although the coefficient estimate of the key independent variable, 
husband’s education, is significant and consistent with other studies, there 
are still some issues associated with the model and estimation result. The 
estimated returns to one’s own education in my result are substantially 
higher than those in previous study. In Jepsen’s (2005) study, she found 
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that the return to each level of education is larger in 2000 than in 1960; 
and the return to a high school degree ranges from 12 to 17%, the return 
to some college ranges from 19 to 27%, the return to a college degree 
increases from 38 to 60%, and the return to graduate or professional 
degree increases from 55 to 98%. One reason might be that returns to 
education increase over time. Other studies have found increasing returns 
to education over time. For example, Levy and Murnane(1992) find that 
returns to education increased from 1960 to 1990 for both men and women. 
Using more up-to-date data, there are potential increases in the returns to 
one’s own education in my regression result. Another reason could be that 
there is still omitted variable bias in the model. When modeling wife’s 
own education as several dummy variables, they would not only reflect 
the returns to different levels of education attainment, but also pick up the 
effects of signaling one’s ability. As discussed above, one drawback of 
this data set is the lack of proxy variables for one’s ability. Then, without 
explicitly controlling for the wife’s own ability, the dummy variables pick 
up some of the effect of the wife’s ability. Regarding the size of the effect 
of spousal education, this omitted variable problem seems have very little 
impact on the estimation of my interest of study.  This happens because 
one’s own education is more associated with one’s own unobserved 
ability or family background than spousal education, and therefore we see 
potential positively biased estimates of the returns to own education. 
Another limitation is that my method of using a sub-sample may not 
successfully differentiate between cross-productivity effect and martial 
sorting effect.  The coefficient estimate of husband’s education in the 
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sub-sample is not statistically different from that in the full sample. The 
indifferent results have two underlying explanations. If martial sorting 
effect does exist, then after controlling for it, the size of the coefficient 
estimate is likely to decrease as only cross-productivity effect presents. 
Under the assumption of having successfully controlled for marital sorting 
effect, the indifferent results may disprove the existence of marital sorting 
effect. Another explanation for the indifferent results is that using the sub-
sample is not sufficient for teasing out all the assortative mating effect.  It 
only excludes observations with higher potential of having such effect, but 
the remaining observations may still have both effects. Among all previous 
studies of related topics, only Huang et al.(2009) empirically distinguish 
between the cross-productivity and mating effects. Their successful 
differentiation between the two effects is due to using unique twins data 
they collected from urban China. However, without such unique data, one 
can hardly distinguish between the two effects. My approach here can only 
bring some evidence to bear on this issue. 
VI. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I analyzed the relationship between husband’s 
education and his wife’s earnings. According to human capital theory, 
spousal education helps an individual accumulate human capital and 
increase earnings. The alternative explanation is the assortative mating 
effect in the marriage market; that is, those who marry well-educated 
people are of higher ability. Using data from the CPS, I estimate my 
hypothesis with the OLS wage model. The result suggests there is strong 
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evidence for the positive effect of husband’s education on his wife’s 
earnings. Using the original regression model, I consider a sub-sample 
that is designed to restrict the effects of positive assortative mating. The 
result of this regression is consistent with the results from the full sample. 
However, omitted variable bias still presents in the model as the use of CPS 
data cannot effectively control for one’s unobserved ability. Moreover, my 
approach may not fully distinguish between the cross-productivity and 
marital-sorting effects. Further research concerning this topic may need to 
find a more effective way to differentiate between the two effects. 
In this article, a potential channel of post-school human capital 
acquisition, learning within marriage, is proposed. The finding that 
spousal education has effect on one’s own earnings could expand our 
understanding of the theories of human capital, marriage, and the family. 
Labor-market benefits to women appear to be associated with their 
marrying well-educated men. These benefits have implications not only 
for women’s earnings but also for the considerations of future marriage 
partner choice. 
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Do Living Wages alter the Effect of the Minimum Wage 
on Income Inequality?
by Ben Litwin
 
 Anker (2006) proposed a new methodology for calculating the 
living wage in countries around the world.  By looking at OECD nations 
between 2000-2010, we look to see if countries with a national minimum 
wage higher than this living wage value see a notable difference in the 
effect of the minimum wage on income inequality.  Our results show that 
countries with the minimum wage higher than the living wage value do see 
lower inequality, although there is a key value of the minimum wage, at 
which countries start to see disemployment effects that increase inequality.
 This paper will focus on the question, does setting the minimum 
wage equal to or above the living wage impact income inequality? Many 
people agree that the idea behind the minimum wage is to reduce the 
poverty rate.  Most minimum wage legislation and regulations focus on 
the idea that those who work, should be able to provide for themselves 
and their families.1  This brings up the idea of a living wage, which is the 
wage that would be able to sustain a person at the lowest standards for an 
area.  Richard Anker (2006) presented a new methodology for calculating 
the living wage in nations across the world by taking the poverty line in 
a country, and dividing it by the total hours the average person in that 
country works, along with accounting for average workers per household, 
and then adding 10 percent of that value to account for sustainability in the 
case of unforseen expenses.2  To test this model, we will include it into the 
1   Anker, Richard, 2006, “Living Wages Around the World: A New Methodology and Internationally 
Comparable Estimates” International Labour Review 145 (4): 309-10
2    Ibid., 318
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methods of previous research into the effect of the real minimum wage on 
income inequality. One of the main models used to look at this relationship 
is the one presented by John DiNardo, Nicole Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux 
(1996) who looked at wage differentials and saw how the decline in the 
real value of the minimum wage increased inequality.3
 The next section of the paper will look at previous research, not 
only going more in depth about the results of Anker (2006) and DiNardo 
et al. (1996), but also more theories behind why the minimum wage could 
affect income inequality and how the living wage is added into the mix. 
This will be followed by a section about the methodological plan of this 
paper, including selection of explanatory, dependent, and control variables. 
The third section will look at the results of the models, and finally the last 
section will be a discussion about these results and concluding remarks.  
Previous Research
 One of the first models to show the effect of the real minimum 
wage on income inequality was presented by John DiNardo, Nicole Fortin, 
and Thomas Lemieux (1996) who used a Kernel density function.  With the 
density function, they were able to see that there was a large compression 
of data at the minimum wage value, implying that the spread of income 
was being held up at the bottom by the minimum wage.4 DiNardo et al. 
compared the wage differentials for the 10th and 90th percentiles and the 
10th and 50th percentiles, and looked at their change from 1979 to 1988 as 
3    DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution 
of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach.” Econometrica 64 (5): 1002
4    Ibid., 1002
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the real value of the minimum wage dropped by 27 percent.5  They found 
that just for the wage differentials in men, “the minimum wage explains 
25 percent of the change in the 10-90 differential [and] 66 percent of the 
change in the 10-50 differential.”6  These values are even greater when 
looking at the results presented about women.  By using similar methods, 
we will be able to see if this relationship holds on the international level 
and is affected by the living wage.
 The main theory to explain the relationship between the minimum 
wage and income inequality is that the minimum wage is a tool for the 
redistribution of income.  Richard Freeman (1996) lays out this theory 
by showing how other people and corporations pay for higher minimum 
wages.7  The theory presented is that there are three different groups that 
give up part of their wealth to help pay for an increase in the minimum wage, 
the consumers who pay for goods and services produced by minimum wage 
workers, the stakeholders in businesses that pay the minimum wage, and 
low wage workers that lose their jobs due to the higher wages.8  Although 
the basic economic theory, such as what is discussed by Scott Adams and 
David Neumark (2003), would suggest that raising the minimum wage 
would act as a price floor on labor and reduce its demand, Freeman shows 
that previous research on employment effects of actual increases to the 
minimum wage in the United States and the United Kingdom have shown 
the elasticity of demand for minimum wage workers to be around zero.9 
5    Ibid., 1014
6 Ibid., 1030
7    Freeman, Ricahrd, 1996, “The Minimum Wage as a Redistributive Tool.” The Economic Journal 106 (May): 640
8    Ibid., 640-1
9    Adams, Scott and David Neumark, 2003, “Living Wage Effects: New and Improved Evidence,” NBER 
Working Papers no. 9702: 3 and Freeman, 1996, “The Minimum Wage as a Redistributive Tool,”: 641-2.
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Therefore, the groups that mainly pay for higher minimum wages are the 
consumers and the businesses.  This would show that, in theory, increases 
in the minimum wages take money from some people and redistribute it to 
others, causing a decrease in income inequality.
 David Card and Alan Krueger (1995) also discuss the effect of the 
minimum wage on the distribution of wages in chapter nine of their book 
Myth and Measurement.  After briefly mentioning that recent labor market 
data gives no support to the standard economic theory that discusses the 
disemployment effects of the minimum wage, Card and Krueger show 
how increases in the federal minimum wage halt and temporarily reverse 
the trend of growing income inequality in the United Sates over the last 30 
years.10  The effects are only temporary, since in years after the minimum 
wage increases, the wage gap continues to rise again.  Card and Krueger 
also warn that these changes to the level of income inequality are small 
since these increases tend to only increase the incomes of the lowest-
paid workers by a fairly small amount, usually around 10-15 percent.11 
Therefore the effects tend to seem small, although they are statistically 
significant.  
 The other main theory for how the minimum wage affects income 
inequality is presented by Oren Levin-Waldman (2001) and deals with the 
overall wage structure.  The idea behind his argument is that increases in 
the minimum wage apply upwards pressure on other low-wages, even if 
10 Card, David and Alan B. Krueger, 1995, “How the Minimum Wage Affects the Distribution of Wages, the 
Distribution of Family Earnings, and Poverty,” Chap. 9, In Myth and Measurement, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 276-9.
11 Ibid., 277
12 Levin-Waldman, Oren M, 2001, The Case of the Minimum Wage, SUNY Series in Public Policy, edited by 
Anne Schneider, Helen Ingram. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press: 32.
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they are not directly affected by the statutory increase.12  By increasing 
the wages at the lower end of the spectrum, while not having an effect on 
higher wages, the minimum wage closes the wage gap, thereby reducing 
income inequality.  
 Looking more into the living wage, Benjamin Page and James 
Simmons (2000) present an argument in their book, What Government Can 
Do, that focuses on cities across the United States, such as Baltimore, New 
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and Milwaukee, all of which have 
passed living wage laws requiring companies with government contracts 
to pay their employees higher wages so that the workers do not live below 
the poverty line.13  The idea behind these living wage laws is that full time 
employees should not be living in poverty and minimum wages should 
be high enough to reduce poverty levels.  Page and Simmons however do 
warn that minimum wages that are too high could possibly have a negative 
impact on employment and economic growth, but so far there has not been 
a situation among areas with living wage laws where this seems to have 
happened.  All living wage levels have stayed “within the modest ranges” 
so that they can have “a positive contribution to the average incomes of 
poor Americans.”14 
 The model of the living wage presented by Anker (2006) is shown 
in the equation below.
Living Wage=               +10%
Poverty Line
Hours worked
Workers per household
13 Page, Benjamin I. and James R. Simmons, 2000, What Government Can Do: Dealing with Poverty and 
Inequality, American Politics and Political Economy, edited by Page, Benjamin I. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press: 226
14 Ibid: 226-7
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Anker presents this as a suitable model to find a standard way of 
calculating a living wage since the living wage is meant to be an “hourly 
wage rate required to support a household at the poverty line.”15  Using this 
definition, Anker created the model being used along with factoring in an 
additional ten percent to account for unforseen costs or personal savings 
for bigger purchases.16  Anker does discuss whether to use one worker 
per household or two, since the traditional family includes two working 
adults, but many low-income families only have one working adult due to 
the cost of childcare.17  Therefore we will look at the model using both one 
worker per family and two workers per family.  Finally there are various 
ways to calculate the poverty line.  For a basic measure, we will be using 
the World Bank’s relative poverty line, which is simply 50 percent of the 
country’s mean income.18  Although this is not the most exact measure of 
poverty, it will be sufficient to calculate a living wage.  
Methodological Plan and Data
 Using the formula for the living wage previously shown, we will 
be able to calculate the living wage for OECD nations and then compare 
this value to the actual federal minimum wage in these countries.  This 
will divide OECD nations into two groups, countries with the minimum 
wage below the living wage, and countries with the minimum wage at or 
above the living wage.  From this comparison we will be able to create a 
15 Anker, 2006, “Living Wages Around the World”: 312
16 Ibid., 318
17 Ibid., 323
18 “Choosing and Estimating a Poverty Line,” Poverty Reduction and Equity, The World Bank Group, accessed 
November 16, 2014, http://go.worldbank.org/AOCMSD1N30
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dummy variable equal to 1 if the minimum wage is at or above the living 
wage and 0 if the minimum wage is below the living wage.  This will lead 
to the following regression.WDit=β0+β1 MWit+β2 LWit+β3 MWLWit+X+u
Where WD is the wage differential being measured, MW is the minimum 
wage, LW is the dummy variable for whether or not the minimum wage is 
at or above the living wage, and finally there is an interaction term to see 
if the effects of the minimum wage on the income inequality in countries 
where the minimum wage is above the living wage is different from other 
countries.  X represents all other control factors that will be in the model, u 
is the error term, and i represents the different countries while t represents 
the different years.
 The control factors being used will be modelled after the research 
of Ximing Wu, Jeffrey Perloff, and Amos Golan (2006) who show the 
effect of different governmental policies on income inequality in urban 
and rural areas.19  Since Wu et al. found a statistically significant difference 
between urban and rural populations, we will use this as one of our controls, 
along with the percentage of the population in different age groups, social 
expenditure, the national GDP, and the unemployment rate.20  Finally, 
Card and Krueger (1995) found that the effect that the minimum wage 
has on income inequality significantly depends on the percentage of the 
population that would be affected by a minimum wage increase.21  To 
19 Wu, Ximing, Jeffrey M. Perloff, and Amos Golan, 2006, “Effects of Government Policies on Urban and Rural 
Inequality.’ Review of Income and Wealth 52, no. 2
20	 Ibid.,	231	for	the	results	of	their	being	a	statistically	significant	difference	between	urban	and	rural	areas	and	
 Ibid., 222 for the list of other control factors.  
21 Card et al., 1995, Chap. 9, In Myth and Measurement, 297.
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account for this, we will also use the percentage of the population below 
the poverty line.  
As stated earlier, this model will be run using calculations for the 
living wage with one and two workers per family since the traditional 
family includes two working members, while many low-income families 
only have one worker due to the cost of child care.  We will also be 
running separate regressions for the wage differentials for the 90th and 
10th percentiles to measure full inequality, and 50th and 10th percentiles to 
measure lower tail inequality.  This comes from the methods of DiNardo 
et al. (1996) since they not only found a compression of wages at the 
lower tail of the density function, but also big changes in the effect of the 
minimum wage when just looking at the lower end of the spectrum.22 
 The data for this research will be collected from the OECD 
database for all variables except for the percentage of the population 
that lives in urban environments, since the OECD does not keep track of 
that data.  Therefore urban population percentage data will come from 
the World Bank’s database.  We will be looking at data from the years 
2000-2010 since many of the variables being observed do not have very 
consistent data points before that period, and some variables do not have 
any data reported after 2010.  Finally, only 25 of the 34 OECD countries 
have been included in this study since the OECD does not have minimum 
wage values for the other nine. Therefore Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland will not be 
22 DiNardo et al., 1996, “Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages.”
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included in this study due to the inability to compare their minimum wages 
with the living wage values calculated for them.  
 We have two main hypotheses for this model.  The first hypothesis 
is that the minimum wage will help reduce income inequality.  This is due 
to the redistributive effects of the minimum wage.  Higher minimum wages 
will lead to more wealth being taken from consumers and businesses, and 
given to low-income workers, which would result in lower inequality.  The 
second hypothesis is that minimum wages at or above the living wage 
will have a significantly higher effect on reducing income inequality than 
countries with lower minimum wages.  This is somewhat an extension 
of the first hypothesis since the countries with minimum wages above 
their living wage value will have higher minimum wages, but also this 
hypothesis would provide evidence that the formula for the living wage 
created by Anker (2006) would be an effective calculation that showed 
how living wages help improve the relative standard of living for low-
income workers in a particular country. 
Results
 By running the regression for the 90-10 wage differential using 
panel data methods to control for country and time fixed effects, we find 
the results shown in table 1.  The first column represents the values when 
the regression is run using one working family member and the second 
column shows two working family members.  
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Table 1. 
90-10 percentile wage differentials on variables altering 
calculations for the living wage between one and two 
working adults.
One working adult Two working adults
Minimum Wage -0.0102 -0.0935**
Living Wage Dummy -0.0000414 -0.350***
Min Wage∙Living Wage Dummy -0.000798 0.0768**
Social Expenditures 0.00002 0.000038
Urban Population -0.00262 -0.00295
GDP 0.0000001**** 0.0000000885***
Unemployment Rate 0.0234*** 0.0154*
Poverty Rate 0.202**** 0.202****
Population Under 18 3.70* 3.67*
Population 18-40 -0.662 -0.588
Population 41-50 -3.55 -4.76*
Population 51-65 -4.079 -4.55
Population 66-75 4.59 3.075
Population 76 and over -3.34 -2.88
Constant 2.30* 2.95**
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01****p<0.001
 This model shows that the effects of the minimum wage and living 
wage on income inequality, as measured by the wage differential between 
the 90th and 10th percentiles, is highly significant when calculating the living 
wage using two working adults in the house, while they are not significant 
when the living wage is calculated using one working adult.  Looking closer 
at the data, this relationship could stem from the fact that there are very 
few observations where the minimum wage is equal to or higher than the 
one working adult living wage.  Therefore, it is more accurate to look at 
the relationship while using the two working adult model.  This provides 
evidence that not only do higher minimum wages significantly reduce 
overall income inequality, but also that the group of countries with minimum 
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wages at or above the two working adult living wage have significantly less 
inequality, but the minimum wage is less effective at reducing inequality 
in these countries, thereby showing that at a certain level, these higher 
minimum wages will start increasing inequality, as shown by the positive 
estimate on the interaction term.  This was accurately predicted by Page and 
Simmons (2000), since minimum wages higher than a certain amount could 
start to have a stronger disemployment effect than redistribution effect.23 
Also, although many of the control variables do not appear to be significant, 
we found the joint significance of the control variables related to economic 
conditions (social expenditures, urban population, GDP, unemployment 
rate, and poverty rate) to be highly significant and the joint significance of 
the age variables to be highly significant.
 Now that we see the influence of the minimum wage on income 
inequality for the whole population, we can look at the relationship when 
only looking at the lower tail of the income distribution.  DiNardo et al. 
(1996) found that the minimum wage had a significant effect on overall 
inequality, but for the lower end of the wage spectrum, changes in the real 
minimum wage accounted for the overwhelming majority of changes in 
inequality for men, women, and pooled genders.24  Expanding on these 
results, we can see how adding in the effects of a living wage changes this 
significance, results for which are shown in table 2.   Again, the control 
variables are all jointly significant by group (economic conditions and 
age variables) even though many of these variables are individually not 
significant. 
23 Page et al., 2000, What Government Can Do, 226
24 DiNardo et al., 1996, “Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages,” 1030.
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Table 2. 
50-10 percentile wage differential on variables altering 
calculations for the living wage between one and two 
working adults.
One working adult Two working adults
Minimum Wage -0.0111* -0.081*
Living Wage Dummy 0.064 -0.0505
Min Wage∙Living Wage Dummy -0.00498 0.0117
Social Expenditures 0.00000778 0.00000784
Urban Population -0.000703 -0.000781
GDP 0.00000000748 0.00000000916*
Unemployment Rate 0.00166 0.000954
Poverty Rate 0.077**** 0.0772****
Population Under 18 1.83*** 1.69***
Population 18-40 -0.265 -0.268
Population 41-50 0.0574 -0.075
Population 51-65 0.981 0.798
Population 66-75 0.943 0.844
Population 76 and over 0.0129 -0.126
Constant 0.729* 0.852**
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01****p<0.001
We still see the relationship found by DiNardo et al. (1996) since the real 
value of the minimum wage does have a statistically significant effect on 
this low tail wage differential.  That being said, this relationship is only 
significant at the 10 percent level, which brings to question how they found 
over two thirds of the change in this wage differential to be a result of the 
falling value of the minimum wage.  As for the effects of the living wage 
on the lower end of the income distribution, this data does not provide 
significant evidence that there is a change in the effect of the minimum 
wage on inequality when the minimum wage is at or higher than the living 
wage.  This is further enhanced by the evidence shown that increases in the 
minimum wage do not affect the countries that fit into the living wage group 
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differently than the countries that do not.  Another important observation 
to make is that, unlike with the 90-10 percentile wage differential, there 
is not a difference in significance when comparing the one working adult 
model to the two working adult model.  Both show the minimum wage to 
be statistically significant, but not the living wage nor the interaction term.
 Finally since we did find results that were less significant than 
those presented in the paper by DiNardo et al. (1996), this brings up the 
question of whether the different data sets have an effect (since they looked 
at the differences between the 50 states while we compared different 
OECD countries) or is adding the living wage variable and the interaction 
term into the equation changing the results.  In order to see this, we run the 
regression without either of the variables that deal with the living wage, 
the results for which are found in table 3.
Table 3. 
Both wage differential models without the living wage 
related variables
90-10 differential 50-10 differential
Minimum Wage -0.0024 -0.0143***
Social Expenditures -0.00000469 0.0000108
Urban Population 0.00558 -0.000322
GDP 0.000000107**** 0.00000000968**
Unemployment Rate 0.0249*** 0.00114
Poverty Rate 0.208**** 0.0742****
Population Under 18 3.32* 1.86****
Population 18-40 0.000000337**** -0.0000000337
Population 41-50 -2.88 0.0866
Population 51-65 -1.98 1.116*
Population 66-75 4.19 1.65**
Population 76 and over -4.87* -0.0657
Constant 1.31 0.572**
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01****p<0.001
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 These results are very interesting, since the effect of the minimum 
wage on income inequality without using the living wage related variables 
becomes extremely more significant for the lower tail of the income 
distribution, but for overall distribution, the effect of the minimum wage 
becomes less significant without considering the living wage.  This 
ambiguously answers why some of the results seen here are different than 
those observed by DiNardo et al. since the lower tail differential would 
state that including the living wage would be creating bias in the estimates 
and making the minimum wage become less significant, while the full 
income distribution differential would show that accounting for the living 
wage would help eliminate bias and show that changes in the real value of 
the minimum wage do affect income inequality.  
Conclusion
 The model presented by Anker (2006) for calculating the living 
wage does prove to show that there is a reduction in overall income 
inequality when a country sets its minimum wage equal to or higher than 
this value.  That being said, this result only occurs when the living wage 
is calculated using the traditional two workers per family, as opposed 
to a one worker family which can be typically found in low-income 
households.  However, the most likely explanation for this variation is that 
of the 231 observed minimum wages, 58.44 percent of them are above the 
living wage when calculated using two workers, while only 4.33 percent 
of them are above the living wage when calculated for one worker.  This 
would show that there is probably not enough data to properly estimate 
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the effects of the one worker living wage on income inequality, since the 
calculation for one worker living wage produces a higher living wage, 
therefore countries that fall into the living wage category for one worker 
would have higher minimum wages.  Based on all other findings, these 
extremely high minimum wages should produce even lower inequality, 
but the results were not significant.  Finding more data that would include 
more observations for countries with minimum wages higher than the one 
worker living wage would provide for a more accurate estimation of the 
relationship and would be excellent for further research in to the subject. 
 As for the hypothesis that stated the minimum wage helps to reduce 
income inequality, we find that there is significant evidence to support 
this.  Except for two of them, all of the regressions that were ran provide 
statistically significant estimations that show the negative relationship 
between the real value of the minimum wage and income inequality.  The 
two that do not provide evidence supporting this hypothesis are the model 
that regressed the 90-10 differential on the one worker living wage (which 
was discussed earlier as to why these results could be biased due to a lack 
of observations) and the model that used the 90-10 differential but did not 
include living wage related variables.  Although there is not a good theory 
as to why the second regression mentioned here provides different results, 
this one model should not disprove the findings that the minimum wage 
does reduce income inequality.  
 Our hypothesis that relates to the effect of the living wage is shown 
to be true for when looking at the full income distribution, but not when 
only looking at the lower tail distribution.  Again, this is only looking at 
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the two worker living wage model.  This shows that Anker’s calculation 
for a living wage does lead to an effective estimate of the living wage since 
countries that have minimum wages at or above this level prove to have less 
income inequality, even though increases to the real value of the minimum 
wage past a certain level will eventually start to increase inequality in 
these countries due to disemployment effects of minimum wages that are 
too high.  The fact that the estimate for the living wage’s effect on the 
distribution of low tail incomes is not statistically significant does not 
disprove this hypothesis, but instead shows that minimum wage increase 
do not significantly change the income of minimum wage workers relative 
to other low wage workers.  This could be a result of a spillover effect that 
were discussed earlier in the theory presented by Levin-Waldman (2001), 
which stated that “an increase in the minimum wage could exert an upward 
pressure on the wages of those earning above the new minimum wage.”25 
Looking at the spillover effects of the minimum wage and seeing how they 
affect the lower tail of the income distribution would provide a good area 
for further research into this subject.
 Overall, setting the minimum wage at or above the living wage 
does reduce income inequality.  The policy implications of this would 
be that countries raising their minimum wages to be equal to the living 
wages calculated using Anker’s model would help fight the rising 
income inequality.  The idea is very simple, since the main objective of 
most minimum wage legislation, as stated earlier, is to reduce poverty. 
25 Levin-Waldman, Oren M, 2001, The Case of the Minimum Wage, 32.
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Therefore, setting the minimum wage at a level that is found using the 
poverty line, as is done in the model presented by Anker (2006), would 
help to reduce poverty and inequality.  
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Nominal GDP Targeting: A Policy Recommendation to 
Meet the Fed’s Dual Mandate.
A Fed Challenge Response Paper: Fall 2014
By R. Shaw Bridges III
Abstract:
This paper was written in early December 2014 in response to the Federal 
Reserve Challenge Team’s argument for a regime change in the Federal 
Reserve to nominal GDP targeting as the appropriate policy to return 
the U.S. economy to long-term sustainable economic growth. After the 
2007 recession, the FOMC took extraordinary measures to minimize the 
collateral damage caused by bank balance sheets weighed down with 
mortgage-backed securities and other below-investment grade assets. 
The periodic “stress tests” and use of emergency lending facilities were 
historically unprecedented, however, the economy six years later was still 
growing slowly in part due to market uncertainty with FOMC forward 
guidance policy. This paper argues that the Fed is justified in using a policy 
that risks short-term rapid inflation in order to meet the “dual mandate” of 
full employment and price stability, and to prevent cyclical unemployment 
in the economy from deteriorating into structural unemployment.
In 2007, the United States suffered the worst economic downturn 
in recent memory. In response, risk-averse businesses and consumers have 
withdrawn from investment and spending in order to pay off outstanding 
debts. This process of deleveraging, while focused primarily in the 
housing sector, has not only slowed economic growth in the recovery, but 
has also led to persistently low rates of labor force participation as well 
as inflation (Wenli Li and Susheela Patwari 2012, 9, and Fed Challenge 
Manuscript (FCM) 2014). The initial measures the FOMC took to avert an 
economic depression during the recession, which included the opening of 
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emergency lending facilities and the implementation of periodic stress tests 
of bank balance sheets, were extraordinary, and until this disaster struck, 
historically unprecedented (Ben Bernanke 2012, 2). Now approaching six 
years into the official period of recovery with interest rates still at the zero 
lower bound, analysts are divided over their interpretations of relevant 
economic metrics, and whether or not they indicate the much-desired 
self-sustainable economic growth needed to return to stable price levels 
and labor market conditions. This disagreement over interpretations of 
economic metrics in different sectors has only exacerbated uncertainty in 
financial markets, evidence for which has become increasingly apparent 
with threats of bond-market sell-offs in anticipation of Fed Chair Janet 
Yellen’s speeches after the monthly meetings of the FOMC (Gavin Davies 
2014).
In his address to the NABE Policy Conference late in February, 
economist Lawrence Summers stated aptly that today, monetary policy 
experts “wish for the problem of minimizing fluctuations around a 
satisfactory trend” (Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 65). Yet, as economist 
Michael Woodford maintains, if policy-makers fail to act decisively and 
with the utmost transparency, there is a distinctive risk this “wish” for real 
growth and a return to full employment will not be granted anytime soon 
(Michael Woodford interview, 2014). In order to effectively communicate 
monetary policy in the near future, it is this author’s contention that a 
regime change to nominal GDP targeting is needed [See Figure 1]. In this 
paper, I argue this suggested deviation from the current forward guidance 
policy is necessary to meet the dual mandate of full employment and price 
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stability. Not only does this policy allow the Federal Reserve to firmly 
commit to economic recovery in the short term, but it also eliminates 
instability associated with uncertainty over the current ambiguity regarding 
the decision to raise interest rates. While short-term rapid inflation is a risk, 
however, prolonged economic stagnation can lead to a deterioration of 
cyclical into structural unemployment, which produces long run hysteresis 
in the economy. This real risk is sufficient justification for the adoption of 
this bold policy measure.
U.S. Economy After the Recovery
 The Gettysburg College Federal Reserve Challenge Team’s 
argument for nominal GDP targeting is reliant on several historical metrics 
that over the past several years have caused the Federal Reserve to adjust 
downward its estimates of future real growth. According to the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, the most recent estimate in the third quarter of 
2014 has revised real GDP upward to 3.9% from the previous advance 
estimate of 3.5%. This data point reflects a fall in the percentage change 
from last quarter, due to a downturn in private inventory investment and 
a deceleration in exports, investment spending, personal consumption 
expenditures, which was offset by an 10% increase in federal government 
consumption expenditure and gross investment (Lisa Mataloni, et. al. 
2014). Despite the positive upward revision approaching the 4.6% growth 
in the second quarter, our Fed Challenge team was skeptical that the nearly 
4.0% growth seen in these last two quarters is sustainable. The strong 
growth we have been experiencing over the past two quarters is a transitory 
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phenomenon due to a temporary decrease in oil and gas prices. Although 
consumers will have more to spend in the short-term, there is little reason 
to expect this level of growth to continue indefinitely (Patricia Cohen 
2014). Yet, even if the BEA is now observing evidence of significant real 
growth, the persistent underperformance of the economy in the years since 
2007 has led analysts at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to revise 
downward estimates of potential GDP [Figure 2] (FCM 2014). According 
to these estimates, Lawrence Summers argues, economists at the CBO 
believe we can return to a steady trend in growth, however, the leisurely 
speed of the recovery has caused them to reevaluate both the size of the 
capital stock and sustainable labor input (Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 
66). These revisions have had the perhaps unintended affect of overstating 
the incremental upward movements in GDP analysts have observed in the 
last two quarters. The period of economic recovery we are experiencing 
has not involved a return of GDP to its potential.
 This need for growth in excess of current trends is further 
exacerbated by estimates of labor force participation and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics estimates of unemployment. Despite the recent positive 
indication of a drop in unemployment to 5.8%, a breakdown of this metric 
reveals a still volatile labor market [Figure 3] (BLS employment summary 
2014). Both long-term unemployed and civilian labor force participation 
have been mostly constant since April, and still seven million are employed 
part-time out of necessity, possibly due to a skills mismatch [Figure 4] 
(ibid). Furthermore, while employment has shown marginal growth 
in health and food services industries, financial, mining and logging, 
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information, wholesale trade, and government employment numbers have 
largely remained unchanged month to month (ibid.). As our team indicates, 
the revision to 5.8% places us at the high end of the bracketed region of 
unemployment estimates for October between 5.2 and 5.8 as depicted in 
Figure 4. Contrary to the narrative of improvement and progress toward 
full employment, the Fed Challenge team argued that the consistently slow 
restoration of labor force participation indicates just the opposite. They 
cited November estimates of labor force participation at 62.8% of the 
population, which shows little improvement from 63% in September this 
year. Likewise, in their report for the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
Stephanie Aaronson and colleagues indicated that the employment to 
population ratio (currently at 59.2%) is still only little over a half percentage 
point higher than the low in the recovery period (Stephanie Aaronson et. 
al., 2014, 2). Labor force participation changes in response to factors such 
as declining market opportunities, wage growth, import competition, and 
retirement, under good economic conditions (ibid., 9, 12). Aaronson and 
colleagues indicates many participants dropping out of the labor force 
temporarily, such as young people enrolling in higher education programs, 
or discouraged workers, may have done so in response to slack in the labor 
market, and will likely return once conditions improve (ibid., 14). Using 
panel data of state level unemployment and LFP, the authors of this study 
found that between .25 and 1% of the decline in labor force participation 
was explained by cyclical effects. Yet, if a return of employment numbers 
an job growth is persistently slow, there is a risk that previously qualified 
workers will lose too much of their human capital. These authors reveal 
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cyclical pressures on employment and highering during the post-recession 
economic recovery, and more importantly, that there are still thousands of 
discouraged workers searching for employment opportunities (ibid., 22-
4).
The Fed challenge team argued against economists who maintain 
that the currently low employment numbers in the U.S. are due primarily 
to pre-recession structural changes. Economists who argue that cyclical 
pressures often mask changes to the long-term composition of the 
unemployment rate have interpreted the Beveridge curve as evidence 
of structural unemployment. Peter Diamond and Aysegul Sahin’s recent 
analysis of the “Beveridge curve” over past recessionary periods in the 
business cycle contradicts this narrative of structural unemployment in the 
labor market (Peter A. Diamond and Aysegul Sahin 2014). They reveal 
instead that the underlying relationship between the job vacancy and 
unemployment rates indicated by the curve reveals historically consistent 
outward movements following recessionary periods. These outward shifts 
suggest that firms are reluctant to resume a steady pace of new employee 
hires out of the labor force following a dip in production (ibid.). Whether 
due to the increased scrupulousness of firms selecting between potential 
employees from an unusually high population of qualified unemployed 
workers, or due to the continuation of the firm and household deleveraging 
process, firms are not hiring at high enough rates to put downward pressure 
on wages. This is evident from wage growth indicators such as average 
nominal hourly earnings, which is currently hovering at around 2.2 percent 
growth this past year [See Figure 5].
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Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen indicates that while nominal 
wages have grown at a 2% rate for several years, in real terms wages 
have been flat (Janet Yellen Aug. 2014, 9). She argues this slow real wage 
growth will not exert “any meaningful upward pressure on inflation,” 
which means nominal wages will not rise for some time after employment 
starts to pick up (ibid). As our Fed Challenge team argued, this lack of 
inflationary pressure on wages will likely persist in foreseeable future, 
especially since oil prices, which recently dropped as low as $65.9 per 
barrel at the end of November, has and will contribute to even lower long-
term inflation [Figure 6]. Lower energy prices, while only temporarily 
putting downward pressure on inflation, have also led to a temporary 
surge in GDP growth that will only last as long as oil prices remain 
depressed (Jonathan Spicer and Rodrigo Campos 2014). In the aftermath 
of the recession, firms were unable to lower wages due to “downward 
nominal wage rigidity,” so layoffs were preferable. Now with economic 
conditions improving, firms have a larger pool of job applicants, including 
but not limited to the previously laid off workers (Janet Yellen 2014, 10). 
Therefore, these metrics collectively indicate a persistently sluggish labor 
market, which is certainly not creating the necessary demand for more 
workers to meet the Federal Reserve’s mandate of full employment (FCM 
2014, 2).
In the years since the Great Recession, much analytical work has 
been done to grasp the economic implications of the process of household 
and firm deleveraging mentioned above. There has been a significant and 
steady downward trend in percentage of debt service payments to disposable 
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income. This downward trend shows that households are, as of early this 
year, continuing the process of deleveraging debts, such as paying down 
old household mortgages. According to Wenli Li and Susheela Patwari, 
the ratio of household credit to disposable income indicates that, as of 
2012, U.S. citizens were only halfway through the process of deleveraging 
(2012, 15). The downward trend in the total credit liability as a ratio of 
disposable income reveals households are continuing to pay down this 
debt-overhang [Figure 7]. Moreover, household savings rates have 
remained high since the recession, hovering at around 3% higher than the 
low in 2007 [Figure 8]. In their book House of Debt (2014), Atif Mian and 
Amir Sufi argue that this process of household deleveraging has led to a 
lack of consumption growth, especially in low-income households that 
responded to the housing price shock by reducing their MPC (Atif Mian 
and Amir Sufi, 2014). Until this debt-overhang is paid down, household 
expenditures as a percentage of disposable income will continue to make 
an insufficient contribution to consumer spending and by extension GDP 
growth. Moreover, as economist Richard Koo has demonstrated, this 
process of deleveraging in the United States indicates we are recovering 
from a “balance-sheet recession,” which can lead to prolonged deficiency 
of aggregate demand (Richard Koo 2011, 1). He argues a policy that sets 
a low target for inflation is futile unless households are beginning to halt 
the deleveraging process. In the recovery from a balance sheet recession, 
aggregate demand is responsive to asset price changes, and not to relative 
changes in consumer prices (ibid). As the Fed Challenge team clarifies, 
however, the housing market as indicated under the Case-Shiller Home 
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Price Index, has recovered slightly this past year [Figure 9]. This is a 
positive indicator that a pick-up in consumer demand is possible, with a 
push from monetary policy-makers. In the next section, I argue the policy 
our team recommended supports this much-needed growth back to pre-
recession trend of GDP.
Moreover, liquidity injections into the banking system have not 
increased the lending and borrowing practices of households and banks 
necessary to offset the fall in consumer spending. Lenders and borrowers 
are still repairing their damaged balance sheets and are hesitant to assume 
more debt-obligations due to perceptions of investment risk (ibid). 
Firms and households have been forced for years to deleverage their 
existing debts, despite interest rates at historic all-time lows. There has 
been some concern that banks are more likely to abuse the risk-taking 
channel and take on excess amounts of low-quality credit due to relaxed 
lending standards associated with future expectations of low interest 
rates (Teodora Paligorova et. al., 2012, 25). Yet the deleveraging process 
left banks that had damaged balance sheets following the recession with 
their hands tied behind their backs, hesitant to lend borrowers. Recently, 
however, the number of banks reporting tightening lending standards has 
dropped significantly, indicating that lenders are beginning to make loans 
to borrowers with potentially poor credit ratings. As the Fed Challenge 
team research into the financial sector indicates, there has been a renewal 
of levered loans despite the opposition of financial regulators, indicative 
of the below investment-grade securities packaged and sold before the 
financial crisis.
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Investors will likely sell these leveraged loans with impunity to 
clients who in search of cheap, high returns, so long as the Federal Reserve 
continues to keep interest rates low [Figure 10] (Peter Eaves 2014). In a 
Financial Times article written this September, Tracy Alloway and Gina 
Chon indicate more that than a third of loans given out by U.S. banks in 
2014 came with leverage exceeding Federal Reserve guidelines, which are 
supposed to limit loans to bearing a value no more than 6x a company’s 
annual earnings (Tracy Alloway and Gina Chon, 2014). Thus, the “frothy” 
growth we have experienced in the financial sector is likely more artificial 
and hence unsustainable outside zero-lower bound conditions. Koo argues 
that the “trauma” firms and households experience after paying down 
the debt-overhang creates an “exit problem” following balance sheet 
recessions. This phenomenon has been observable in Japan since the 
1990s, where the private sector is borrowing averse, interest rates are at 
the zero-lower bound, and government debt as of 2012 was 237 percent 
of GDP (Richard Koo 2011, 34). The concurrent volatility of financial 
markets and household deleveraging in the United States renders higher 
interest rates an impractical Federal Reserve policy in the near future.
Still, expectations of positive economic improvements in the 
United States has led both to appreciation of the dollar, and depreciation 
of foreign currencies [Figure 11]. Recent developments in foreign markets 
suggests that global economic growth may bear down on domestic growth 
as well. The Bank of Japan has recently opted to continue another round 
of LSAPs indicating efforts to depreciate the Yen. Likewise, ECB banks 
of Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland will likely decide to adopt similar 
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unconventional policies such as LSAPs to stem the appreciation of the 
Euro (Nouriel Roubini 2014). New York Fed President William Dudley 
recently commented on Bloomberg that if the dollar appreciates against 
these foreign currencies, the result could mean lower net exports and a 
subsequent “dampening” of inflation (Alister Bull 2014). In developing 
a policy, the Federal Reserve must consider the possibility of external 
threats to self-sustainable growth in the coming years, and weigh the risks 
of high inflation compared with continued disinflation in the economy.
Defense of Nominal GDP Targeting
 This fall, the Gettysburg College Challenge Team offered 
what I have maintained was a convincing analysis of the state of U.S. 
macroeconomic conditions in the wake of the 2007-9 recession. The U.S. 
economy since the Great Recession has been growing at a sluggish pace 
resulting in higher labor market slack than indicated by the current 5.8% 
unemployment statistic. Moreover, recent data indicators, such as dropping 
energy prices and irresponsible financial investment have led to spurious 
signs of growth that is unsustainable outside zero-lower bound conditions. 
In the past two months, the Federal Reserve has ceased its program of 
Large Scale Asset Purchases, leaving forward guidance strategies as our 
primary tool to reduce long-term interest rates (FCM 2014, 3). Different 
types of forward guidance strategies have been tested over the course of 
the recovery, and policy-makers differ in their opinions of its effectiveness. 
From Auguest, 2011 to October, 2012, the Federal Reserve tried calendar 
based forward guidance, promising to keep the federal funds rate near zero 
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until a specified date in the future (ibid.). In December 2012, the Federal 
Reserve altered its criteria to data-based forward guidance, by promising 
to keep rates at the zero-lower bound until the unemployment rate passed 
below the threshold set at 6.5% (ibid., 4). Extensive economic literature 
has been amassed analyzing the benefits and drawbacks of both calendar 
and data based policy recommendations.  There are significant practical 
disadvantages of these previous policies that constrain the economy from 
generating the growth necessary to avoid the threat of secular stagnation. 
I maintain that in order to achieve the growth we require, the Federal 
Reserve must adopt a more integrative approach to forward guidance, 
which targets nominal GDP instead of inflation.
 In the past few years, policy-makers at the Federal Reserve have 
concentrated on chasing the simultaneous goals of stronger growth, capacity 
utilization, and financial stability, yet as the macro-economic analysis above 
reveals, this tripartite objective has become more difficult under zero-
lower bound conditions (Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 66). As economist 
Larry Summers indicates, the economy is today underperforming at the 
potential level forecast in 2007 for the year 2014/15, and the improvements 
described by the unemployment to population ratio are murky [Figures 
1 & 3]. The U.S. economy has made almost no progress returning to 
potential output, but Summers argues that declining real interest rates 
should concern policy-makers more (ibid., 69). He argues economists 
might be observing a period he describes as a “reversal” of Say’s Law, in 
which deficient demand yields deficient supply, and that the continuous 
lowering of interest rates to supply the labor force with jobs could render 
75
monetary policy ineffective, and suppress economic growth indefinitely 
(ibid., 71). The result of this secular stagnation could eventually lead to 
a vast number of unemployable workers and a contraction in productive 
capacity, resulting in hysteresis (Matt O’Brien 2014). Moreover, Summers 
indicates the historical record suggests financial instability goes hand-
in-hand with periods of growth. In the recovery period of the business 
cycle especially, with interest rates at the zero lower bound, stability in 
the financial sector becomes harder to achieve in conjunction with strong 
growth. Instead of waiting for the economy to grow naturally, policy-
makers should therefore welcome the inflation necessary to contribute to 
meaningful growth in output.
Summers suggests that the increased MPS of households and 
firms resulting from changes to income distribution, cash hoarding by 
large corporations, and other debt-financed investment demand reducing 
activity may have also lowered the natural equilibrium real rate of interest 
(Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 69). Likewise, Minneapolis Federal Reserve 
President Narayana Kocherlakota argued at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. 
Minsky Conference that in the past six years, the U.S. has experienced 
changes in demand for safe assets that may persist over the coming 
decade (2013, 2). Kocherlakota contends that, given the poor outlook for 
employment and prices, the FOMC should lower the real interest rate even 
further below the 2007 threshold in order to generate significant growth 
(ibid., 6). This growth produced under conditions of low real interest rates 
will likely not come without the cost of financial instability that can occur 
with “inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened 
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merger activity” (ibid., 11). The preponderance of conceivable outcomes 
these authors cite suggests the risks associated with generating significant 
growth are difficult to avoid under slow recovery conditions.
The recommendation for nominal GDP target in part derives 
its strength as a policy from the argument that under current economic 
conditions, there is a chance the U.S. could be heading towards secular 
stagnation. Summers and Kocherlakota’s analyses in conjunction with 
the data our Federal Challenge Panel cited in reference to labor market 
conditions and the output gap indicates the risk of prolonged economic 
stagnation could lead to a contraction of human capital resulting in 
hysteresis. In addition to providing a clear policy criterion both for the 
FOMC and financial markets, the nominal GDP target could solve the issue 
Summers and Kocherlakota emphasize regarding the real interest rate and 
inflation. As Harvard Professor Jeffrey Frankel indicates, a nominal GDP 
target guarantees either acceleration in real growth, or that real interest 
rates will decline in response to the policy, which will in turn put upward 
pressure on aggregate demand (Jeffrey Frankel 2012). If indeed the U.S. 
is heading toward similar stagnation to the Japanese economy for the 
past two decades, the window for the Federal Reserve to adopt growth-
supportive policies is narrowing with each passing year.
Unlike price-level targets, which have been judged to be a similar 
objective criterion, a nominal GDP target would provide greater quantitative 
gains. According to Jérémie Cohen-Setton et. al. (2013), five years out of 
the 2007 recession, the price level was not much lower than it would have 
been growing at 2% per year, whereas nominal GDP fell nearly 10%, as 
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indicated in Figure 1. They maintain the rise in expected inflation would 
thus have been smaller under the price-level targeting regime. Critics such 
as Charles Goodhart argue that unlike inflation targeting, however, NGDP 
would function poorly as a kind of Taylor rule, since it would entail both 
an interest rate as well as an output measure, and thus revisions to NGDP 
over time make the risk of overshooting the target at any given interest 
rate more volatile. A proponent of this policy innovation, Scott Sumner 
argues that unlike inflation targets, an NGDP target would only require 
a single estimate of the output gap at the time the target was set, thus 
avoiding the constant revisionary estimates to the output gap associated 
with “flexible inflation targets” (ibid., bibliography). Although there are 
difficulties associated with finding a long-run sustainable trend that would 
support the economic environment for employment and growth, as Scott 
Sumner argues, it would not be unreasonable to look at what past forecasts 
of growth had been prior to the recession as the goal (Scott Sumner 2012, 
10). Suppose that the estimate for the growth rate set to reach a nominal 
GDP target would overshoot the target if growth accelerated or decelerated 
in the near future? The Federal Reserve would only have to make minor 
adjustments to forward guidance policy and other similarly influential 
policies on future expectations, in order to avoid overshooting the target. In 
this way, it would be clear to outside observers what the Federal Reserve’s 
future plans for the economy are under all possible scenarios for growth. 
Thus, this single criterion communicates the Federal Reserve’s intentions 
more efficiently than if continuous revisions were made to policy and 
hence future expectations based on an output gap estimate.
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Furthermore, Charles A.E. Goodhart et. al. (2013) argues that a 
nominal GDP target policy regime would allow inflation to appear even 
more volatile than under price level targeting, because of uncertainty over 
long-run sustainable output. Yet as these recent critics of NGDP targets 
show, once the Federal Reserve sets the forecast for long-run sustainable 
growth at the pre-recession forecast, the Federal Reserve could also deliver 
a 2% inflation target at that long-run rate. In order to mitigate the risk of 
future adjustments to NGDP, Sumner argues, the Federal Reserve could set 
up futures markets and subsidize trading of NGDP futures contracts. This 
would have the effect of anchoring investor expectations and forecast the 
required monetary base to boost nominal growth, by providing the public 
with incentive to return to pre-recession growth trend (Scott Sumner 2011, 
17-18). For some at the Federal Reserve, this policy still presents a risk they 
are unwilling to take due to the uncertainty of previous forecasts, possibly 
due to ex post facto reasons associated with growth estimates prior to the 
recession. Scholars have misconstrued the majority of these components 
of NGDP targets as drawbacks that impede its implementation, and not as 
strengths, or at least net advantages over and above current inflation target 
policy. As it stands, our Team’s current recommendation inadequately 
addresses these concerns and should be changed if more members of the 
Federal Reserve are one day to be swayed to by our assessment.
79
Conclusion
The recommendation our panel made to the Federal Reserve 
is necessary to provide the much-needed future growth our economy 
needs to avoid secular stagnation. The current growth trends in the U.S. 
economy are indicative of slow growth from the recession of 2007-9, 
which will lead to persistently low labor force participation. Likewise, 
financial stability can only be achieved in strong growth conditions, 
once the Federal Reserve is able to raise interest rates without disrupting 
the process of deleveraging and subsequent growth in investment and 
consumer expenditure [Figure 12]. The sooner the Federal Reserve can 
return to pre-recession long-run sustainable growth trends the better. By 
setting a nominal GDP target, the Federal Reserve would be making a 
commitment to return the economy back to full employment levels before 
unemployed citizens of the United States become unemployable, and our 
potential output capacity contracts. Raising rates now would be premature, 
and while other policy regimes have had historically limited success, the 
burden of proof falls on our recommendation. As such, any one of the 
advantages to our policy discussed above could be used to persuade a 
battle-tested and wary Federal Reserve.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Nominal GDP & Potential Nominal GDP
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Figure 2: Revisions to GDP
Source: VoxEU.org
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Figure 3: Civilian Unemployment Rate
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 4: Unemployment Rate and Labor Force Participation Rate
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Figure 5: Wage Growth Average Hourly Earnings
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 6: Oil Prices over the past two years
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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Figure 7: Measure of Household “Debt Overhang”
Source: Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Figure 8: Personal Savings Rate
Source: US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Figure 9: Case-Shiller Home Price Index
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC
Figure 10: Bank Lending Standards
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Figure 11: United States Nominal Exchange Rate
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Figure 12: Consumer Expenditure
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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2014 Fed Challenge Script
by: Jieran Liu, Will Northrop, Matthew Nadler, 
Owen Rothe, and Ryan Williams
Economics 267 & 367 Fall 2014
Current State of The Economy
 Good afternoon everyone and thank you for having us here 
today. Though the recession began in 2007 and officially ended in 2009, 
recovery has been painfully slow. GDP growth has been insufficient to 
close the output gap, there continues to be slack in the labor market and 
inflation has stabilized below the Federal Reserve percent target. We are 
not meeting our dual mandate of full employment and stable prices even 6 
years after the end of the recession. Despite some signs of strengthening in 
the economy during the past year, we do not believe that economy is on a 
self-sustaining path of recovery. Furthermore, the monetary policy actions 
taken by the Fed thus far to pull us out of the Great Recession have been 
insufficient. We propose a substantial strengthening of the our forward 
guidance; specifically, a commitment not to raise the federal funds rate 
until nominal GDP has returned to a path that we consider consistent with 
the dual mandate. 
 The Congressional Budget Office estimates the output gap to be 
around 3.6% in 2014 and projects a return to full employment by 2017. 
However, this forecast reflects the fact that the CBO has revised downward 
its estimate of potential GDP every year for the last 7 years. The economy is 
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approaching full employment not because of strong growth in actual GDP 
but because of repeated downward revisions in potential GDP. [VoxEU 
slide] Larry Summers estimates that half of the decline in potential output 
is due to a drop in the capital stock due to lower investment since 2008, a 
phenomenon that could be reversed with sufficient economic expansion. 
 The unemployment rate fell to 5.8 percent in October, at the top 
end of our current range of estimates for the natural rate of 5.2 percent 
to 5.8 percent. But, the low unemployment rate disguises a large amount 
of slack in labor markets. For instance, the labor-force participation rate 
has fallen from 65.9percent to 62.8 percent since the beginning of the 
recession. While some is due to structural factors, research by Stephanie 
Aaronson and her co-workers finds that 0.25 – 1.0 percent of the decline 
is due to cyclical factors. The employment - population ratio is low, also 
suggesting cyclical factors contributing to unemployment. Probably the 
most convincing evidence of slack in the labor market is the failure of 
wages to rise significantly: average nominal hourly earnings increased 
only 2.2 percent in the year ending in October. 
 Inflation has been below the 2 percent target since 2012. According 
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the core PCE chain-type price index 
increased at a rate of only 1.4 percent for the twelve months ending in 
October. There are no signs of inflationary pressure in the economy. Oil 
prices have fallen in recent months due to global economic weakness and 
new energy supplies. The price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil has 
fallen to $81 per barrel at the end of October from over $100 in June. 
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In addition, the dollar has appreciated significantly against other major 
currencies, putting downward pressure on prices of imported goods. And 
again, wage growth has been subdued. The absence of inflationary pressure 
is apparent from the decrease in the spread between the yields of 5-year 
nominal Treasury Securities and 5-year TIPS bonds (or the ‘breakeven 
inflation rate’) which has fallen from 2 percent in June to 1.6 percent in 
November. This indicates that the market expectations are currently that 
inflation will fall short of the target for the next five years.
 The current sustained weakness in the economy is likely to persist 
for a long time. The crash in the housing market weakened household 
balance sheets. Research by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi has shown 
convincingly that the debt overhang has contributed to weak consumption 
growth. Richard Koo calls this a ‘balance sheet recession’ and notes that 
recovery will be slow because of household deleveraging, which reduces 
consumption spending. Koo and other economists such as Larry Summers 
and Olivier Blanchard warn of the possibility of insufficient aggregate 
demand for as long as the next 10-15 years.
 A self-sustaining recovery cannot occur until households have 
worked off the debt overhang. Data on household debt show that there is 
a long way to go. Total credit market debt of households is 105 percent of 
disposal income, still higher than any year before 2002. Consistent with 
Koo’s theory, household savings remains high, especially relative to pre-
recession trends. The personal saving rate has been above 5 percent since 
the recession, compared to 2-4 percent from 2005-07. Recovery in the 
housing market is widely seen as essential for improvement in household 
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finances. But after signs of strength in 2013 the housing market has cooled 
off in 2014. Acording to Case-Shiller home price index, house prices fell 
1.3 percent from April to August of this year. Real residential investment 
has fallen by one percent in the year ending in the third quarter of 2014.
 Recent positive developments have caused speculation that we 
will start raising interest rates in mid-2015. This is premature. Though 
GDP growth was estimated to be 3.5% in 2014 Q3, the widening of the 
trade deficit for September suggests that this figure will likely be revised 
downward.The results of the midterm elections suggest that fiscal policy 
could become more of a drag on economic performance in the near 
future due to increased pressure to cut spending. The low employment 
growth domestically, coupled with slow projected growth for Europe and 
certain emerging economies, suggest that making monetary policy less 
accommodative would be premature and costly to a still-shaky American 
economy. 
Our Policy Recommendation: Clarify Forward Guidance 
 With the phasing out of large-scale asset purchases last month, 
we are currently relying on forward guidance to reduce long-term interest 
rates. But the type of forward guidance that we have employed since 2009 
has been less effective than it could be. From  August 2011 to October 
2012 we specified that  we would keep the federal funds rate near zero until 
a particular date, a policy known as calendar-based forward guidance. In 
December 2012 the we switched to a data-based forward guidance strategy 
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by promising not to raise the federal funds rate until the unemployment rate 
fell to 6.5%. But in March 2012, as the unemployment rate was dropping 
more quickly than anticipated, we changed our criteria to a mix of labor 
market conditions. Michael Woodford has argued that the our statements 
to this point have not had the desired effect because the we have not been 
clear enough about the criteria that we will use to judge whether to raise 
the federal funds rate.  As a result the we have not been as successful in 
managing long-term interest rates as it could be.
 We propose that the Federal Reserve clarify the criteria that will 
trigger the beginning of interest rate increases. Under our proposal, which 
is similar to recommendations made by Michael Woodford and others, the 
FOMC will pledge to maintain the federal funds rate target at its current 
range as long as nominal GDP remains below a deterministic path. This 
path would represent the path it would have followed if monetary policy 
had not been constrained policy by the zero lower bound since 2008. 
Specifically, as indicated by our proposed statement, we project a trend of 
4% annual growth in nominal GDP from the fourth quarter of 2007. We 
commit to holding off on interest rate increases until we are close to the 
target. When we are close to the target we will begin to increase interest 
rates at a measured pace so that policy is normalized at the trend level of 
GDP.
 Our proposal improves on the current forward guidance strategy 
in the following ways.
●	 The nominal GDP criterion clarifies the ultimate goals of the 
FOMC. It replaces the vague references in the current statement 
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to “a wide range of information, including measures of labor 
market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation 
expectations, and readings on financial developments.” We 
thereby send a clearer signal to the public about how much more 
growth must occur before the we begin to raise interest rates.
●	 We estimate that under this proposal we will not begin raising 
interest rates for at least two years. This is a more expansionary 
signal than the current policy, under which expectations are for 
rate increases beginning next summer, which will lower long-
term interest rates.
●	 The nominal GDP criterion promises a combination of real 
economic expansion and higher inflation. The prospect of 
economic expansion will increase consumer and business 
confidence and generate higher spending. The prospect of higher 
inflation will generate more spending by lowering real interest 
rates. Higher inflation also reduces the real value of household 
debt, which will assist in recovery of balance sheets. This is an 
improvement over the current policy, which risks signaling to the 
public that the Fed views the current state of the real economy 
and inflation under two percent as satisfactory outcomes.
 We have prepared some forecasts of what our policy implies 
for the economy. The scenarios shown on the graph assume that the real 
output gap is currently 4 percent and the growth rate of potential GDP is 
2 percent. Real GDP has grown at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in each of 
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the last two years. At this pace, it will take over 13 years for the economy 
to reach full employment.
● Nominal GDP is currently 8.7% below the nominal GDP trend 
line that we hope to achieve. We assume that trend nominal GDP 
grows at 4% per year.
● Scenario 1 assumes that the combination of lower long-term 
interest rates and increased expectations of growth and inflation 
causes nominal GDP to reach its target in two years. This requires 
nominal GDP to grow at an average rate of 8.4% per year. 
Inflation in excess of current levels is unlikely unless there is a 
strong pickup in real GDP growth, so it is reasonable to assume 
that nominal growth is roughly evenly divided between real 
growth and inflation. This would imply 4.2% real growth and 
4.2% inflation per year, which would eliminate the output gap in 
the year that the nominal GDP target is achieved.
● Scenario 2, which we believe is more likely, assumes that the 
nominal GDP trend line is reached in three years. This requires 
nominal GDP to grow at an average rate of 6.9 percent per year. 
If growth is evenly divided between real growth and inflation, this 
implies 3.5 percent real growth and 3.5% inflation per year, and 
again the output gap is eliminated when the trend line is reached.
● Scenario 3 assumes a four year path to recovery. This requires 
nominal GDP to grow at an average pace of 6.2 percent per year. 
Real GDP grows at 3.1 percent and inflation is 3.1 percent, and the 
output gap is eliminated when the trend line is reached.
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 Our policy risks higher inflation if the output gap turns out to be 
smaller than we believe it is. For example, under Scenario 2, nominal GDP 
grows at a rate of 6.9 percent per year. If the output gap is two percent rather 
than four percent, we could conceivably see the output gap eliminated 
in two years and real growth falling to two percent in year three, which 
would imply a 4.9 percent rate of inflation in that year. Clearly inflation 
at that level is not acceptable in the long run, but a temporary burst of 
inflation is a small price to pay for full recovery from the recession. In 
the final analysis, even in the high inflation scenario the average inflation 
rate beginning in 2007 will be near the our target of 2 percent; the higher 
period of inflation we promise for the most part merely compensates for 
the below-target inflation of the last several years. 
 To conclude, we find that the economy is in worse shape than it 
appears to be judging from the unemployment rate and the CBO’s estimate 
of the output gap. The Federal Reserve has fallen short of its mandate of 
full employment and price stability since the recession began in 2007. Our 
proposal offers a chance to restore full employment and price stability. It 
does so by clarifying the our forward guidance statement: specifically, by 
committing us in terms that are as explicit as possible to a period of growth 
and reflation. It is a bold step, but one that is absolutely necessary in light 
of current economic conditions. Thank you for listening, and we welcome 
your questions.  
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Flooding in the Kashmir Valley: Macroeconomic Effects 
of a Natural Disaster in India
by Danielle Cupp
Abstract
This paper presents India’s economic growth by comparing it to that of 
the United States. In addition, this paper analyzes current events in India 
under a macroeconomic lens as it provides the macroeconomic impacts 
of said events. More specifically, this paper focuses on the ways in which 
unexpected severe flooding have impacted Northern India in the short-, 
medium-, and long-run. Analyses conclude with policy recommendations 
based on the goals of India’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
I. Executive Summary
After gaining independence in 1947, India has experienced accelerated 
growth and is now considered one of the largest and fastest growing economies 
in the world. After a fiscal crisis in the early 1900s, India’s economy adopted 
open-market policies and opened to international trade, which is considered 
one of the economy’s most substantial boosts. India, however, still faces a 
number of challenges that impede on its development. India encounters, for 
example, extreme poverty and unresolved territory disputes with Pakistan and 
China. In addition, India is experiencing a period of anemic growth, in which 
its growth rate has declined to 4.4% since 2012. The Indian rupee has been 
depreciating, adding to these economic difficulties (Ranjan Mishra). India’s 
central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, was conceived after independence in 
1947 controls the monetary policy on the Indian rupee and its main objectives 
consist of maintaining price stability and ensuring that there is an adequate 
flow of credit to productive sectors in the economy (“About Us”).
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II. Summary on Developments
Throughout this semester, I have analyzed the macroeconomic 
consequences of unanticipated events in Indian history while analyzing 
the nation’s growth. When comparing India’s GDP to that of the United 
States, we see that they are converging, affirming the theory that countries 
with a lower GDP experience higher rates of growth. In addition, we 
also see that India’s output per capita growth rate, TFP contribution rate, 
and per capita capital contribution are all higher than those of the United 
States. All of these indicate that India’s economy is growing at a faster rate 
than that of the United States. 
In addition, I analyzed the macroeconomic effects of current, 
unexpected events in India. I predicted, for example, the ways in which 
output and unemployment would be affected by a devastating flood. 
I estimated that the impacts would be in particularly severe given the 
storm’s unprecedented harshness and the fact that the economy in that 
region is heavily dependent on the agricultural sector. Next, I analyzed the 
macroeconomic impact on the power industry, specifically coal companies 
as they faced fines and incurred setbacks as the government revoked 214 
coal leases. Lastly, I addressed the ways in which Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi’s war on terror would affect the economy, specifically his crackdown 
on off-shore accounts. I predicted that Indians would transfer more of 
their money back into Indian accounts, increasing the money supply and 
increase total output in the country.
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Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
99
III. Shock Under Analysis: Flooding in the Kashmir Valley 
Flooding in the Kashmir Valley in September of 2014 hit record 
highs in this area of northern India. While monsoons bring devastation 
to this region every year, this disaster qualifies as a shock because it 
was the worst flood the valley has experienced in 100 years, leaving 
600,000 people stranded and numerous roads, schools, bridges, crops, 
and hospitals destroyed. (“Kashmir Flood Disaster – How the Next One 
Could Be Avoided”). The Kashmir Valley lies in the Indian state of Jammu 
and Kashmir; the economy in this region is in particularly dependent on 
agriculture and related activities (“CHAPTER III: Socio-Economic and 
Administrative Development”). Since this flood occurred in September, 
the region has experienced more flooding, hindering the government’s 
ability to rebuild and return to the previous rate of productivity. 
IV. Short-Run Analysis 
To examine the short-run impact on the harshness of the weather 
conditions, we will use the model provided below. The storm will decrease 
productivity, employment, and consumption, which can be modeled 
as a downward shift in the ZZ curve. When the ZZ curve shifts down, 
output decreases (to YA) and the IS curve shifts leftward (to ISA). Due to 
the decrease in output, the demand for liquidity decreases, modeled by a 
leftward shift in the L(Y) curve (to L(YA)). Now, the liquidity and goods 
markets clear at a lower interest rate and output level (iB and YB). When the 
shock is incorporated into the AS-AD model, the AD curve shifts left. As 
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a result, the price level decreases, which increases the real money supply. 
Now, the goods and liquidity markets clear at an even lower interest rate, 
but a relatively higher output level (i1 and Y1). Thus, the ZZ curve shifts up 
(to ZZ1), which demonstrations how the AS-AD model and the liquidity 
market reduce the multiplier effect. In addition, the exchange rate has 
decreased as the rupee has depreciated under the UIP condition.
Figure 4
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V. Medium-Run Analysis 
The same model can be used to display the medium-run implications 
of the shock. For simplicity, the graphs below only show the short-run 
equilibrium (1) with the output, interest rate, exchange rate, and price level 
from the initial equilibrium shown on the axes as a reference. In addition, 
India’s natural rate of output has been added as the economy returns to 
the natural rate of output in the medium-run. India is characterized by a 
large output gap and chronic unemployment. The Reserve Bank of India 
has estimated that the Indian economy has a potential growth rate in the 
range of 8.2 to 10.2 percent, but in recent years the growth rate in India has 
fallen short of the lower limit (“Estimation of Potential Output in India”). 
In 2013, for example, India’s economy only grew by 5% (“GDP Growth 
(annual %)”). As a result of the output gap and chronic unemployment, 
the natural rate of output will be higher than the initial level of output. In 
the medium run, output eventually returns to the natural level of output. 
This adjustment occurs through successive changes in the price level and 
is modeled by shifts in the AS curve. Since the natural level of output is 
higher than the actual rate of unemployment, the AS curve will shift down. 
This lowers the price level (to P2), which increases the real money stock. 
The rightward shift in the real money results in a decrease in the interest 
rate and a downward shift in the LM curve. Consequently, the decrease in 
the interest rate increases investment (from i1 to i2), which shifts the ZZ 
curve upward (to ZZ2). The exchange rate has decreased again and the 
rupee has continued to depreciate under the UIP condition.
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VI. Long-Run Analysis 
The long-run effect of this mass flooding in Kashmir can be 
modeled in the Solow Growth Diagram. The increase in the severity of 
this natural disaster (in addition to other flooding that the region already 
experiences) has caused the physical capital to depreciate more rapidly. This 
is modeled by a leftward swing in the break-even line. In addition, since the 
flooding was so severe that it destroyed crops, output decreased. This can be 
represented as a decrease in productivity (A). This would increase the capital 
per effective units of labor, a rightward jump in ka. Initially, the capital per 
effective units of labor jumps right (to k*a, 1) such that it is above the steady-
state value (k*a, 0). Therefore, the amount of capital per effective units of 
labor that the economy is accumulating is less that the amount of capital 
per effective units of labor that the economy is losing due to depreciation, 
technological progress, and population growth. Capital per effective units of 
labor decreases (at a decreasing rate due to decreasing returns to scale) until 
it reaches the new steady state (k*a, 2). Now the steady state value is lower 
than it was initially due to the increase in the depreciation rate. The impulse 
response functions show the new balanced growth paths. The decrease in 
productivity means that output per effective units of labor and capital per 
effective units of labor jump up and then decrease at a decreasing rate until 
they reach the new, lowered balanced growth path. Output per capita and 
output both decrease at a decreasing rate until they reach their new, lowered 
balanced growth paths. These new balanced growth paths are lowered 
because productivity is permanently lowered by this shock.
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VII. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Recommendations 
One of the objectives of the Reserve Bank of India is to achieve 
price stability, but one of the long-run consequences of this shock is a 
decrease in the price level. I suggest both a contractionary monetary policy 
and an expansionary fiscal policy. Under both, the price level will increase, 
output will remain at the natural level out output, and there will be an 
appreciation in Indian currency. As a result of the fiscal expansion and the 
contractionary monetary policy, the ZZ curve shifts up (to ZZA), the real 
money demand decreases (to MC /P) and liquidity demand increases (to 
L(YA)). Consequently, the IS curve shifts right and the LM curve shifts up, 
such that iC and YC clear both the goods and liquidity markets (at point c). 
The AD curve will shift right, but then the AS curve will also shift such 
that the economy returns to the natural rate of output. It is important to 
note that the net effect is an increase in the price level. As a result, the 
real money supply shifts left again, increasing the interest rate, which also 
shifts the LM curve upwards (to LM3). The liquidity and goods markets 
now clear at i3 and Yn. The ZZ curve shifts down such that the output level 
is also at Yn. While there was a fiscal expansion, the increase in the ZZ 
line was offset by the decrease in investment as the interest rate increased 
from i2 to i3.
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